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MARKET REGULATION AND FOR
CORPORATE LAW
THOMAS LEE HAZEN*
Managers ofpublicly held corporations in the United States
face increasing pressure to maximize their companies' near-term
earnings. This pressure emanates in part from the financial
markets, which have in recent years experienced a period of un-
precedented change and innovation. In this Article, Professor
Thomas Lee Hazen examines the current state of American fi-
nancial markets. Professor Hazen presents a thorough overview
of investment theory, market forecasting techniques, develop-
ments in state corporate law, and current federal regulatory pol-
icy. He also discusses many of the new derivative instruments
and innovative trading techniques that investors currently utilize.
Professor Hazen contends that markets have become more vola-
tile in recent years, causing investors to focus increasingly on
near-term performance. He further asserts that the proliferation
of short-term derivative instruments has exacerbated this prob-
lem. As investors demand superior near-term results, corporate
managers feel compelled to shore up current earnings, often at
the expense of investing for the future. Professor Hazen proposes
reforms to reverse this situation that, if left unchecked, may pose
dire consequences for the health and competitiveness of the
American economy.
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
During the past decade, financial markets have experienced unprec-
edented volatility resulting in many wide price swings within very short
periods of time. This volatility has coincided with two major develop-
ments. First, the current regulatory philosophy of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) and of the Commodity Futures Trading
* Cary C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill; B.A. 1969, J.D. 1972, Columbia University. The author acknowledges the
helpful research assistance of Rhonda Schnare, UNC Law class of 1991, and Lee Potter, UNC
Law class of 1992. Part of the work for this Article was funded by the North Carolina Law
Foundation.
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Commission (CFTC) has fostered the development of an increasing array
of options, futures, and other derivative investment vehicles. Second, the
hostile takeover and leveraged buyout movements of the 1980s emerged
as major market forces. These developments have shifted investor atten-
tion away from long-term gain and towards day-to-day market perform-
ance and, according to some, have encouraged corporate managers to
focus on short-term goals for their companies.
In managing an enterprise or in establishing a strategic plan, manag-
ers must decide the extent to which they will focus on short-term rather
than long-term goals. It is a popularly held belief that managers of pub-
licly held companies in the United States are preoccupied with the cur-
rent value of the company and its shares, thereby neglecting the long-
term interests of the firm.
Over the past twenty years, academic commentators have increas-
ingly stressed the importance of economic analysis in establishing corpo-
rate norms and legal parameters. This development has not gone
unnoticed by market regulators. The SEC's Chief Economist, for exam-
ple, has wielded considerable influence upon that agency's decisionmak-
ing process. Much of the current wave of economic analysis focuses on
shareholder wealth maximization. This in turn pressures corporate man-
agers to promulgate programs and policies which favor maximization of
near-term earnings at the expense of the company's long-term interests.
Adding to this pressure are a number of recent developments in both
state and federal law that have shifted the balance even further in the
direction of short-term goals.'
This Article begins by defining and examining the nature of the cur-
rent overemphasis on short-term performance. Part II of the Article ex-
amines the market's pricing mechanisms and the various investment
theories used to explain market performance. In Part III, the Article
analyzes the extent to which the proliferation of derivative investments
(options, futures, and index-related investments) in financial markets
have affected share pricing and have contributed to the narrowing of in-
vestor time horizons. Part IV examines the conflicting empirical evi-
dence concerning the question of whether corporate managers are in fact
unduly emphasizing near-term performance. In Part V, the Article con-
siders the market for corporate control and the extent to which the take-
over movement of the 1970s and 1980s has forced managers to focus on
short-term profit maximization. The Article concludes that both the
SEC's current regulatory philosophy and state corporate law encourage




an undue emphasis on the near term. Rather than continuing their juris-
dictional turf battle, the SEC and CFTC should rethink the underpin-
nings of their regulatory philosophies, which currently favor the
proliferation of derivative investments. State law, which traditionally
governs corporate managerial norms, has, since its inception, tried to bal-
ance the inherent tension between shareholder control and managerial
autonomy. State legislators should be mindful of this tension when con-
sidering proposals to relax fiduciary principles, as such proposals may
have detrimental effects on the health and viability of American business.
A. Defining the Problem
In recent years the increased volatility of the stock and other finan-
cial markets has shifted investors' goals from the long term to the short
term.2 The best evidence of this is the increased use of derivative invest-
ments such as options and futures, which by their nature have short expi-
ration periods.
The takeover movement of the last two decades has shown that pub-
licly held shares trade at a minority discount below the asset, takeover,
or break-up value of the firm. The best anticipatory defense to a hostile
takeover is for management to keep the company's stock trading at a
high price in order to minimize the lure any control premium may offer.
This, in turn, may shorten management's time horizon when making cor-
porate and strategic decisions.
Throughout this Article a distinction is drawn between short-term
shareholder interests and long-term corporate interests. Management's
obligation to optimize long-run firm value may well conflict with its de-
sire to maximize gains in the short term.3 For example, the prospect of
huge research costs or expansion expenses can result in a high takeover
or break-up value in comparison to the present discounted value of the
going concern. Managers of a company that has been profitable over the
past several years often have to decide whether and to what extent gains
will be distributed to the shareholders or reinvested in the business.
It is not only the shareholders and optionholders who have an inter-
est in the short-term performance of a company's shares. The ability of a
2. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hazen, Volatility and Market Inefficiency. A Commentary on the
Effects of Options, Futures, and Risk Arbitrage on the Stock Market, 44 WAsH. & LEE L. REv.
789, 805 (1987).
3. See James A. White, Giant Pension Funds' Explosive Growth Concentrates Economic
Assets and Power, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1990, at Cl. Short-term interests generally, but not
always, focus on shareholder wealth maximization. Defining short-term goals in this manner
may oversimplify the issues to some extent, but it will suffice when analyzing the effects that an
undue short-term outlook has on financial markets and on corporate law.
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business to raise additional capital, whether by way of equity or debt,
depends largely upon the market's current valuation of the company's
shares. By focusing on current earnings, management may be able to
maintain a higher share price, thus facilitating their ability to raise cash
as needed. Accordingly, managers may tend to employ accounting prac-
tices and promote business and investment policies that enhance current
earnings, even though such policies might diminish profitability over a
longer time horizon.
Of course, short-term and long-term interests can coincide. Con-
sider, for example, the case of a company engaged in the manufacture of
phonograph records, a rapidly declining industry. Assume that the com-
pany's plant and other assets have considerable value. Because vinyl
phonograph records are becoming obsolete, the company's shares are
valued significantly below its liquidation value. Management could de-
cide to expand the business beyond record manufacturing (much as the
tobacco companies embarked into other fields in anticipation of declining
tobacco markets). Alternatively, the firm could close its doors and liqui-
date. Short-term shareholder wealth maximization would call for liqui-
dation in such a scenario since it is highly likely that any shift in the
company's business would not be reflected immediately in the share
value. The long-term interest of the firm might also favor liquidation
over entry into industries where management has no experience.
Although short-term and long-term interests do not invariably di-
verge, they are in conflict most of the time. Investors and corporate deci-
sionmakers should take into account both time horizons when making
their investment and business decisions. Unfortunately, today's market
environment inhibits rather than encourages such a balancing of consid-
erations. The investment markets, fueled by the proliferation of options
and futures, are largely driven by short-term forces. Market regulators
have not been sufficiently attuned to this development, and the resulting
lack of oversight has contributed to the problem. While federal regula-
tors scramble to catch up to events, state legislators have been struggling
to balance their desire to allow corporate directors and officers wide dis-
cretion to run their businesses with the competing and seemingly con-
flicting demand of investors that short-term share value be maximized.
This struggle implicates important questions regarding the duties of di-
rectors and officers to their shareholders and to the corporation itself.
B. The Nature of Directors' Obligations
It is a well-established axiom of corporate law that corporate man-
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agers owe a fiduciary obligation to the corporation and its shareholders.4
The structure of the corporate enterprise, however, contains an inherent
tension between managers' fiduciary obligations to the shareholders and
management's own self-interest. The divergence of managers' and share-
holders' interests has been described in terms of differing risk preferences
with regard to their respective stakes in the enterprise of the firm.' Iden-
tifying what is in the best interest of the corporation can be a function of
the many different ways of viewing the interests of its shareholders. For
example, a shareholder in a publicly held corporation is often viewed
primarily, if not exclusively, as an investor. Alternatively, one might
consider a shareholder a proprietor of the business.' In considering the
shareholders' perspective, one should take into account both their invest-
ment and their proprietary interests in the corporation. As an investor, a
shareholder probably is interested primarily in short-term profit max-
imization, especially in today's volatile markets. In contrast, the proprie-
tor of a business is likely to have a longer time horizon.
The impact of varying time horizons is even more acute when con-
sidering the perspective of corporate managers. Managers with a longer-
term view are likely not to worry about daily stock price fluctuations and
can pay attention to maximizing firm value in the long term. Conversely,
a manager obsessed with share prices may resist proposals to invest in
beneficial but costly projects for fear that near-term earnings may suffer.
4. See, e.g., HENRY W. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 358 (1927);
HARRY G. HENN & JAMES ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES § 325 (3d ed. 1983); WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF
CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 1.06 (4th ed. 1988); E. Mernick Dodd, Jr., For
Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1145, 1162-63 (1932); Rudolph
E. Uhlman, The Legal Status of Corporate Directors, 19 B.U. L. REV. 12, 30 (1939).
For a statute that explicitly sets forth the fiduciary obligation of management, see N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1982) (repealed 1990) ("Officers and directors shall be deemed to stand in
a fiduciary relation to the corporation and to its shareholders."). With the adoption of the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act, the new North Carolina Act no longer speaks ex-
plicitly in terms of management's fiduciary obligations. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30
(1990); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1984). Nevertheless, the Model Act
still imposes duties of due care and loyalty on directors. Id. For an excellent analysis of the
rise of conflict of interest rules, see Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Inter-
est and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 35 (1966).
5. John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web,
85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1986).
6. See Thomas L. Hazen, Corporate Chartering and the Securities Markets: Shareholder
Suffrage, Corporate Responsibility and ManagerialAccountability, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 391, 433
[hereinafter Hazen, Corporate Chartering]. Many observers today believe that shareholder
primacy is an outmoded model of corporate governance. Elsewhere, I have considered the
inappropriateness of diminishing the importance of shareholders. Thomas L. Hazen, The Cor-
porate Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REV. 273, 293-
301 (1991) [hereinafter Hazen, Persona].
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The tension between long-term and short-term goals appears vividly
in the takeover context. Proponents of corporate takeovers assert that, in
launching a hostile tender offer, the bidders are helping to maximize
shareholder value.7 Target management typically responds by resisting,
claiming that it is looking out for the long-term interests of shareholders.
This explanation, however, probably does not represent the target man-
agement's underlying motive. While the long-term interests of the firm
may be furthered by something other than shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion, one must remember that the corporation consists of an aggregation
of various constituencies or stakeholders. When observers speak in terms
of interests other than short-term wealth maximization, they are refer-
ring to these non-shareholder constituencies.
Shareholder wealth maximization as a guiding principle for corpo-
rate managers is not limited to the takeover context. Some observers
have suggested that managers should focus on maximization of share-
holder wealth in making investment decisions generally with regard to
corporate assets. At least one commentator believes that this approach
offers more managerial guidance than does "shabby" fiduciary duty
principles.'
C. Market Performance
The obsession many managers currently have with near-term earn-
ings results partly from a perceived vulnerability to takeover resulting
from the tendency of financial markets to "discount" stocks.9 In an effi-
cient market, the price of shares reflects the discounted present value of
the company's future as determined, among other ways, by analysts' and
investors' collective evaluation of the total mix of publicly available in-
formation. 10 If the price is discounted below that level, the market's un-
dervaluation must be attributable to some other factor(s). There are a
number of possible explanations.' I One possibility is that investors be-
7. As discussed more fully below, the Delaware rule is that once a company is "for sale,"
the directors' sole obligation is to maximize shareholder wealth. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986); see infra text accompanying notes
276-78.
8. Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38
UCLA L. Rv. 277, 389 (1990).
9. See, eg., Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Dis-
counted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 894-91 (1988).
10. See infra text accompanying note 67.
11. See, eg., Kraakman, supra note 9, at 894-901. In the face of a wide variety of explana-
tions, it has beeh suggested that there has yet to be a satisfactory answer to the "riddle of
takeover premiums." Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market
Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1259-68 (1990).
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lieve that current management is not in the best position to realize the
firm's potential.12 Others have suggested that target company shares are
not undervalued at all; instead, bidders offer unduly high control
premiums. 13
Many observers and current SEC policymakers view takeovers as
"value creating"14 and therefore as'a positive economic' force. Some
economists, especially those representing the view of the Chicago School,
believe that takeover premiums provide strong evidence that takeovers
permit corporate assets to be employed in the most efficient manner."5
However, no consensus has yet been reached on the riddle of takeover
premiums.
If the current price adequately takes account of a company's long-
term prospects, then it would make little sense to talk of long-term share-
holders' interest as distinct from their short-term interest. 6 The mar-
ket's assessment of the future, however, does not reflect the interests of
other constituencies, such as employees, that have a stake in the corpora-
tion's future. To this extent, price is not an accurate reflection of the
long-term interests of all corporate stakeholders.
As valuation is central to the discussion of the short-term/long-term
dichotomy, one must possess a basic grasp of how prices of investment
instruments are determined in modem financial markets. This requires
an inquiry into the various theories of valuation and market behavior.
Part II attempts this task.
II. THEORIES OF INVESTMENT ANALYSIS EXPLAINING STOCK
PERFORMANCE
Three basic approaches have been used to predict and explain the
behavior of stock prices: fundamental analysis, technical analysis, and
those investment strategies that flow from the Efficient Capital Market
12. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Managers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J.
POL. ECON. 110, 112-13 (1965).
13. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REv. 597,
599 (1989). In auction theory this is referred to as the "winner's course." See Paul R. Mil-
grom, Private Information in an Auctionlike Securities Market, in AUCTIONS, BIDDING, AND
CONTRACTING: USES AND THEORY 140 (Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. eds., 1983).
14. See, e.g., Kraakman, supra note 9, at 894.
15. See, e.g., Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Antitakeover Amendments, Manage-
rial Entrenchment, and the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 71 VA. L. REv. 1257, 1302
(1985).
16. This analysis is flawed insofar as it fails to take transaction costs into account. For
example, the tax consequences to shareholders that would result from a sale at a high price
may make it preferable for low-basis investors to keep rather than sell their shares.
1991]
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Hypothesis.' 7 Fundamental analysis involves following the performance
of particular companies and attempting to identify securities whose
prices do not fairly reflect the analyst's evaluation of the company's fi-
nancial condition. Technical analysis is based purely on the past market
performance and other "key indicators." 18 Technical analysts employ
various systems and strategies to identify securities (or other investment
media) whose past performance indicates that they are likely to be strong
or weak in the future. Traditionally, research analysts have adhered to
the fundamental theory of investing, although an increasing number are
incorporating or relying primarily upon the technical approach.
The efficient market theory basically posits that the market price
accurately reflects currently available information about a company and
thus is a good indication of "value." The Efficient Capital Market Hy-
pothesis has generated a number of corollaries and variations, including
the "random walk" theory which holds that stock market prices cannot
be predicted. 19 The random walk theory is often used to denote the
whole concept of an efficient market. It defines market efficiency as the
lack of dependence between successive price movements. Adherents to
this theory assert that, since price fluctuations are essentially random,
fundamental and other forms of market analysis are of limited predictive
value in selecting stocks.20 Not surprisingly, this theory does not have a
wide following in the professional investment community.
A. Market Pricing
Before examining the three basic approaches to investment strategy,
it is worth summarizing the leading theories relating to factors that affect
the market's pricing mechanism. Under classical investment analysis,
the current price reflects the discounted value of future returns. In the
case of investment securities, future returns traditionally were viewed in
17. See, eg., CHARLES V. HARLOW, AN ANALYSIS OF THE PREDICTIVE VALUE OF
STOCK MARKET 'BREADTH' MEASUREMENTS 6-30 (1968); see infra notes 67-75 and accompa-
nying text.
18. Key indicators include not only the price performance of particular securities but also
the trading volume, insider selling, short interest, interest rates, market averages, unemploy-
ment figures, and other economic data that can be charted over time. These figures may be
compared to the market as a whole as well as to other indicators.
19. See, ag., PAUL H. COOTNER, THE RANDOM CHARACTER OF STOCK MARKET
PRICES 1-6 (1964); BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 129-33
(5th ed. 1990); Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock Market Prices, 38 J. Bus. 34, 35-45
(1965); Vincent J. Tarascio, Economic Theories of the Stock Market: Random or Non-Random
Walk?, in THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 41 (Patricia A. Adler & Peter
Adler eds., 1984) [hereinafter SOCIAL DYNAMICS]. The random walk is not unique to the
stock market; it is simply a mathematical model that has been applied to the stock market.
20. See, eg., MALKIEL, supra note 19, at 151-55, 177-85.
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terms of dividend streams.2 Empirical evidence, however, convincingly
shows that even prior to the explosion of options and futures trading,
stock price volatility was higher than could rationally be explained by
dividend changes.22 The same evidence also supports the view that divi-
dend changes, combined with the market's assimilation of information,
do not adequately explain price movements.23 Some observers have ex-
plained the excessive volatility as a result of investors' "'irrational judg-
ments about uncertainty.' "24 Other explanations include what Keynes
dubbed the "animal spirits" of investors in overreacting to information.
25
As volatility increases, the herd instinct causes many investors to follow,
which in turn magnifies price movements.26 To the extent that investors
overreact, the markets are focusing on the short-term rather than long-
term view,27 and astute analysts can take advantage of the overreaction
by short-term trading strategies.
Some recent studies contend that, beginning in the 1980s, the finan-
cial markets have become excessively volatile.28 Skeptics of this claim
have argued, however, that these studies are based on efficiency models
21. Id. at 28-30.
22. E.g., Robert J. Shiner, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent
Changes in Dividends?, 71 AM. ECON.'REv. 421, 421-22 (1981); see, eg., Marjorie A. Flavin,
Excess Volatility in the Financial Markets: A Reassessment of the Empirical Evidence, 91 J.
POL. ECON. 929, 929-30 (1983); Sanford J. Grossman & Robert J. Shiller, The Determinants of
the Variability of Stock Market Prices, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 222, 222-26 (Papers and Proceed-
ings Issue, 1981); Allan W. Kleidon, Variance Bounds Tests and Stock Price Valuation Models,
94 J. POL. EON. 953, 954, 971 (1986).
23. Stephen F. LeRoy & Richard D. Porter, The Present-Value Relation: Tests Based on
Implied Variance Bounds, 49 ECONOMETRICA 555, 555-59 (1981); Ariel Pakes, On Patents, R
& D, and the Stock Market Rate of Return, 93 J. POL. ECON. 390, 395 n.3 (1985); Shiller, supra
note 22, at 423.
24. Kleidon, supra note 22, at 998 (quoting KENNETH J. ARROW, STANFORD UNIV. CTR.
RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONAL EFFICIENCY, TECHNICAL REPORT No. 399, BEHAVIOR
UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY (1983)).
25. JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND
MONEY 161 (1936).
26. It has been suggested that contagion theory, which explains mass behavior, applies to
investor behavior as well. Michael Klausner, Sociological Theory and the Behavior of Financial
Markets, in SOCIAL DYNAMICS, supra note 19, at 57, 60-62; see SERENO S. PRATT, THE WORK
OF WALL STREET 358-72 (1912); Patricia A. Adler & Peter Adler, The Market as Collective
Behavior, in SOCIAL DYNAMICS, supra note 19, at 85, 89-94; Wayne E. Baker, Floor Trading
and Crowd Dynamics, in SOCIAL DYNAMICS, supra note 19, at 107, 114-25; see also NEIL J.
SMELSER, THEORY OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 170-88 (1962) (describing conditions of con-
duciveness in economic crazes); Ritchie P. Lowry, Structural Changes in the Market: The Rise
of Professional Investing, in SOCIAL DYNAMICS, supra note 19, at 19 (describing other exam-
ples of contagious investor behavior).
27. Wayne Joerding, Are Stock Prices Excessively Sensitive to Current Information?, 9 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 71, 71-72, 80 (1988).
28. See, e.g., Lawrence Harris, S&P 500 Cash Stock Price Volatilities, 44 J. FIN. 1155,
1155 (1989) (comparing the volatility of the Standard & Poor's Composite 500 Stock Index
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that incorrectly assume that investors are risk neutral, when in fact most
investors are risk averse.29 Proponents of the efficient market theory as-
sert that the efficiency models still work and that exchange trading with
risk averse investors merely results in higher volatility than trading with
risk neutral investors.30
Another response to criticisms of the market's excessive volatility
has been to assert that prices are not in fact excessively volatile when
considered in light of investors' rational expectations. 3 1 It is claimed, for
example, that the percentage movement in financial markets has not in-
creased significantly, but that it only appears to be so because of the
higher price of shares and stock averages. Some observers are of the
view, however, that studies supporting the efficiency and rational expec-
tation paradigms are based on volatility tests marred by statistical
problems and that unbiased tests continue to cast doubt on the Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis.32
If one thing is clear from the foregoing overview of pricing theory, it
is that many proponents of the hypothesis have come to recognize the
difficulty in reconciling theory with the existing evidence of excess vola-
tility. In the words of one observer:
One obvious route of reconciliation [of the disparity between
efficiency models and volatility] is to maintain that expectations
are not rational. If investors driven by "animal spirits," over-
react to current information, it would explain the surprising
volatility of asset prices. Such an explanation not only violates
neoclassical tenets, it also clashes with the evidence which has
been adduced in favor of the efficiency of asset markets. Hence
the challenge to economic theory is clear. Theory must provide
a model of asset pricing consistent with (1) rational expecta-
tions and optimizing behavior, (2) the empirical martingale
property of stock prices, and (3) the high volatility of stock
prices.3
Thus, much debate continues over market pricing mechanisms. For
between 1975-1983, a period of time before index options and futures were utilized, and the
post-1983 era, when use of these instruments became widespread).
29. Stephen F. LeRoy & C.J. LaCivita, Risk Aversion and the Dispersion ofAsset Prices, 54
J. Bus. 535, 536-39 (1981).
30. Id.
31. Kleidon, supra note 22, at 971-72, 996-98.
32. N. Gregory Mankiw et al., An Unbiased Reexamination of Stock Market Volatility, 40
J. FIN. 677, 686-87 (1985). In presenting their conclusions, the authors concede that the unbi-
ased samples on which they rely may not be statistically significant. Id.
33. Ronald W. Michener, Variance Bounds in a Simple Model of Asset Pricing, 90 J. PoL.
EcoN. 166, 167 (1982). "Martingale" is a term used to describe a gambling system in which
the stakes are doubled after each loss.
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the purposes of this Article it is not necessary to resolve the debate, but
merely to acknowledge that it exists. Regulation (or nonregulation) of
the securities and other financial markets must be framed with acknowl-
edgment of the debate's existence. The foregoing claims denying excess
volatility are based on market activity prior to the proliferation of op-
tions, futures, and index trading. As discussed more fully below, it is this
writer's contention that the excessive volatility that currently exists is at
least in part the result of a laissez-faire regulatory stance34 and that this
approach cannot be justified in light of the current evidence.3" Before
discussing such conclusions, however, it is necessary to investigate the
methods that investors use in attempting to forecast market movements,
because the predictions and expectations of investors as reflected in stock
prices play a prominent role in the short-term/long-term debate.
B. The Basic Approaches to Investment Strategy
1. The Fundamental Approach
A securities analyst or investor employing a "fundamental" strategy
of investing is seeking to discover a security's intrinsic value.36 Funda-
mental investment analysis theory holds that when market prices fall be-
low (or rise above) this intrinsic value a buying (or selling) opportunity
arises, because the fluctuation will be corrected eventually.
The obvious problem with fundamental analysis is the difficulty of
determining intrinsic value. The fundamentalist hopes that a thorough
study of industry and individual firm conditions will produce valuable
insights into factors that may reflect future performance of the company,
but which are not yet reflected in market prices. An analyst relying on
fundamentals will examine, among other things, the firm's balance
sheets, income statements, investment plans, and management records in
hopes of finding information previously undiscovered. From this data,
he will attempt to estimate the company's future streams of earnings and
dividends. A basic premise of the fundamental theory is that the intrin-
sic value of stock is equal to the present or discounted value of future
dividends.37 When valuing a stock, the fundamentalist generally takes
the perspective of a long-term investor. Long-term investors do not an-
ticipate an imminent sale of their holdings; thus, the only direct benefit
34. For an explanation of the strong view of market efficiency, see infra text accompany-
ing note 75.
35. See infra part VI.
36. MALKIEL, supra note 19, at 110-29, 157-85.
37. Id. at 29.
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they can expect is the payment of cash dividends.3"
Traditional fundamental analysis generally involves the examination
of four specific factors in order to estimate a security's intrinsic value.3 9
These four factors are: (1) the expected dividend payout (both level and
duration); (2) the expected dividend growth rate; (3) the degree of risk;
and (4) the market interest rates." Other things being equal, a rational
investor should be willing to pay a higher price for stock that has a high
expected growth rate or a high expected dividend payout.4 In addition,
a security with a low degree of risk or a relatively high rate of return
compared with lower prevailing rates should generate a higher price
from investors.42
38. Id. The takeover movement of the 1970s and 1980s, however, has prompted increas-
ing emphasis on a firm's asset value rather than its dividend value. This trend, among other
things, has helped lead many scholars to rely on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
Stout, supra note 11, at 1241 ("The CAPM incorporates portfolio theory into efficient market
theory to predict that, because investors value stocks according to their risk-adjusted returns,
stocks with identical estimated levels of market risk should trade at prices that imply an identi-
cal estimated rate of return.").
The Capital Asset Pricing Model assumes that demand is elastic and that pricing is deter-
mined by investors' collective assessment of the firm's potential. Hence, if a stock is underval-
ued in investors' eyes, increased buying demand will push the price upwards. Conversely, with
an overvalued security, selling pressure will force the stock down to its appropriate level.
Under the Capital Asset Pricing Model, it is assumed that an elastic demand exists and that
investors operate on a series of homogeneous assumptions in valuing the shares known as the
assumption of "homogeneous beliefs." The assumption of homogeneous beliefs has been at-
tacked as unrealistic, and it has therefore been suggested that we consider an alternative "het-
erogeneous beliefs" model under which each investor's process of information sifting and price
valuation varies. Id. at 1238-39.
Opponents of the Capital Asset Pricing Model further posit that rather than an elastic
demand that rises and falls in accordance with the current market, stocks have a naturally
downward sloping demand. Given a downward sloping demand, the market becomes skewed
by large block transactions which then are said to have an inordinately significant impact on
market pricing. Id. at 1239-41.
39. MALKIEL, supra note 19, at 82-88.
40. Id. at 87-94. The fundamentalist is aware that the actual price of a stock is dependent
on factors such as the economy and events within the company; these four specific factors,
however, supposedly will enable one to calculate correctly the stock's true value in order to
compare it to the actual price.
41. Dean Malkiel notes:
The theory stresses that a stock's value ought to be based on the stream of earnings a
firm will be able to distribute in the future in the form of dividends. It stands to
reason that the greater the present dividends and their rate of increase, the greater
the value of the stock.
Id. at 21.
42. Most investors prefer a stable stock, one that has smaller price swings relative to the
market as a whole. See, eg., id. at 92-93. Low risk stocks, then, can command a premium
because of the demand for them. This assumes, however, that the investor is risk averse.
Market interest rates also influence the demand for stocks and, therefore, the price of
stocks. Id. at 94. If interest rates go up, investors will put their money in the bond market to
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Fundamental analysis obviously is not a true science. No one can
consistently and accurately predict the future. Even after a thorough
analysis, the security analyst's valuation is still only an educated guess.
Moreover, "[p]recise figures cannot be calculated from undetermined
data."43 Because much of the underlying data is itself guesswork, an an-
alyst's predetermined bias can influence his or her calculations. Thus, a
security analyst often is able to obtain the figure she wants by consciously
or unconsciously manipulating the determinants. Some combination of
growth rate and growth period will produce any specific intrinsic value
desired.
Despite these caveats, a study conducted in 1970 suggests that the
four-factor approach of fundamental analysis is valid." The study mea-
sured the actual price of stock in terms of the stock's price/earnings ra-
tio. The results indicate that high price/earnings multiples are associated
with a high expected growth rate.45 In fact, the study concluded that
market prices tend to behave just as the four-factor approach suggests.
This implies that a logical connection does exist between a security's in-
trinsic value and its market price. Thus, it is contended that any current
deviation from a stock's intrinsic value should correct itself. This study
appears to support the validity of the fundamentalist's approach to pre-
dicting stock prices. If an analyst or investor accurately estimates the
four determinants and then correctly calculates a security's intrinsic
value, she just has to compare it with the stock's actual price to know
whether to trade.
Observers have identified three 'possible problems with the funda-
mental theory.46 First, the information and analysis may be incorrect.
The information the analyst collects from studying the firm and the in-
dustry may not fairly reflect present or potential financial condition.
And even if the information obtained is correct, an unskilled analyst may
fail to estimate accurately the impact of the four determinants. Second,
the analyst's ultimate valuation may be incorrect. Many factors affect
the price of stock in addition to the four specific determinants.47 Trans-
obtain the higher rate of return, thereby causing the price of stocks to fall. See, e.g., id. Alter-
natively, when interest rates drop, money will flow back into the stock market, thereby causing
stock prices to rise.
43. Id. at 90.
44. Burton G. Malkiel & John G. Cragg, Expectations and the Structure of Share Prices,
60 AM. ECON. REV. 601, 601 (1970).
45. MALKIEL, supra note 19, at 98, 100.
46. Id. at 124-26; HARLOW, supra note 17, at 14-16.
47. Other factors affecting a stock's value include the economy, takeover bids, manage-
ment skill, and news events such as a discovery within the company or a natural disaster.
MALKIEL, supra note 19, at 28-45.
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lating all the factors into one single estimate of intrinsic value is ex-
tremely difficult. Even if the estimates of growth, dividends, and other
factors are correct, any difference between the actual market price and
the intrinsic value may simply represent a faulty estimate. Third, the
divergence between the market price and the perceived intrinsic value
may never be eliminated. The market may correct its "mistake" by re-
valuing all stocks downward, instead of raising the price of the "under-
valued" stock. If the analyst is correct in his determinant analysis, his
clients would still suffer if the market revalued downward its estimates of
what stocks were generally worth.
Consider the following example: Suppose that XYZ Company has a
price/earnings ratio of twenty to one. Suppose further that the analyst
estimates that XYZ can maintain a long-term growth rate of twenty-five
percent and that, on average, stocks with an anticipated growth rate of
twenty-five percent are selling at thirty times their earnings. Based on
these projections, the analyst reasonably concludes that the stock is a
"buy" because it is undervalued and recommends that her clients
purchase the stock. However, a few months after this recommendation,
the market, rather than correcting the perceived undervaluation of XYZ
stock, revalues stocks with an anticipated growth rate of twenty-five per-
cent to sell at twenty times earnings. As a result of this unanticipated
downward adjustment, the price drops and the investor suffers a loss
even though the analyst's prediction of future performance was correct.
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the success of a funda-
mental approach to market analysis depends on an analyst's ability to
outguess the market. Ironically, the analyst may be correct in predicting
certain events, only to find that the market makes an adjustment that
wipes out the profit that otherwise would have accrued.
2. The Technical Approach
Technical analysis refers to the study of the performance of the mar-
ket itself rather than external factors that affect supply and demand for
securities.48 Although there are many variations on the technical ap-
proach, the discussion that follows describes what is perhaps the most
common variety of market technician-the chartist. The chartist makes
and interprets stock charts of past movements of common stock prices
and trading volume for clues to future price movement. The technician
graphs past stock movements in hopes of identifying a pattern.49 Chart-
48. Id. at 110-11.
49. To construct a chart the technician simply draws a vertical line with the bottom being
the stock's low for the day and the top being the stock's high. A horizontal line is drawn
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ists believe that stock prices tend to move in trends: a stock that is rising
will continue to rise until it meets its resistance level; a falling stock will
continue to fall until it reaches its support level." Resistance and sup-
port levels are determined in part by observing a stock's performance
over time and identifying cycles." Technical analysts claim that inves-
tors all contribute to and are influenced by mass psychology. Therefore,
the best investment strategy is to anticipate how other investors will re-
act. The charts tell the technician how investors have reacted in the past
with the hope that he can predict their future actions. An upward trend
is ordinarily interpreted as a bullish indication that the stock will con-
tinue to rise.52 The technician then awaits the signal that the market has
peaked. This is called a resistance level; it is reached when the stock
begins to turn downward because of insufficient buying interest to gener-
ate a further price rise. When the stock reaches this level the techni-
cian will sell, anticipating that a prolonged downward trend will follow
as it has in the past.
Technical analysis generally results in trading strategies geared to
the short term. Unlike the investor relying upon fundamental analysis,
the technical analyst tends to be a trader rather than a long-term inves-
tor. Technicians expect that an investment's rate of return is a function
of timing trades. They buy when the trend looks positive and sell when
the trend turns negative or when a security approaches its resistance
level.
Three assumptions have been offered to justify an investment strat-
egy based upon technical analysis. One such assumption is that stocks
perform in predictable patterns based in large part upon market psychol-
ogy. For example, one pattern that the chartist believes clearly depicts a
bearish signal is a "head and shoulders" formation. 4 In this pattern, the
stock first rises and then falls slightly, forming a shoulder. It then rises a
little higher and drops back to the original low, forming the head. Fi-
nally, it rises again, but not as high as the head, and falls forming the
second shoulder. If the stock then falls below the previous two lows or
"pierces the neckline," the chartist will sell, believing the market is be-
across the vertical line to represent the closing price for the day. Two lines are then drawn
connecting the tops and bottoms for each day to one another; this delineates an upward or
downward trend. This process can be used for individual stocks or stock averages. Ii at 112-
13.
50. Id. at 118.
51. Technical analysts frequently rely on a "moving average" charted over time.
52. MALKIEL, supra note 19, at 113.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 113-14.
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ginning a downward trend."
A second assumption of technical analysis is that informational ad-
vantages exist within the market. As a practical matter all investors do
not have equal access to information about any particular company.
When an event occurs within a company, insiders will be the first to find
out and to trade on the information, causing the stock price to either rise
or fall.5 6 Gradually, the information is disseminated down to profes-
sional traders and the public. This filtration process results in a slow
increase in the price of stock following favorable news and a decrease
when the news is bad. The technician hopes to identify these patterns
early in the filtration process. In this way, technical analysis depends
upon the market as an efficient but relatively slow mechanism for filter-
ing information.
A third assumption upon which technical analysis is grounded
posits that investors remember what they paid for a stock.57 If the price
of a stock declines after a number of investors have bought in, they will
want to sell when the stock goes back to its original purchase price in
order to break even. This price will become a resistance area because the
selling will prevent the stock from going any higher.5" The same logic
lies behind the notion of support levels. If a number of investors fail to
buy when the market is low, they will feel deprived when prices rise.
Consequently, when the market drops to the original low level, investors
will buy.5 9 That price then becomes a support level since the buying
prevents the market from falling any further."°
The principal arguments against technical analysis are threefold.
First, technicians trade only after prices begin to move.6' It is not always
possible to react in a timely manner and anticipate market movement.62
If investors fail to react quickly, they may be too late to take advantage
of the movement. 6 Second, the technique may be self-defeating consid-
55. Id. at 113-15.
56. See, ag., id. at 119.
57. Id. at 117.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 120.
60. Technicians believe that by identifying resistance and support levels they will be able
to identify the signals to trade. When a stock declines to a support level and then begins to
rise, technicians will buy, believing the stock is beginning an upward trend. Alternatively, if a
stock reaches a prior resistance level and goes no further, the technician will sell, believing the
stock has reached its peak. Another bullish signal is sent when the stock breaks through a
prior resistance level. The former resistance level then becomes a support level and the stock is
believed to have begun an upward trend.
61. HARLOW, supra note 17, at 27-29; MALKIEL, supra note 19, at 118-20.
62. MALKIEL, supra note 19, at 118-20.
63. Id. Furthermore, if the market is truly efficient in the "strong" sense, there in fact
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ering the aggregate effect of transactions."4 If all technicians are antici-
pating that prices will rise tomorrow, they will act today. Consequently,
prices will increase today and any advantage the technician hoped to gain
will vanish because the market will adjust. No buy or sell signal can be
successful if a large number of investors attempt to act on it simultane-
ously. Third, and perhaps most importantly, empirical studies reveal
that no correlation exists between yesterday's price and today's price.6"
The stock market has no memory, these studies claim, and therefore,
past movements in stock prices do not foretell future movements. Coin
flipping provides an apt analogy in that the results of each flip are in-
dependent of any previous results. Sometimes a long string of heads may
occur, but that does not mean the next flip will result in heads. Mathe-
maticians call this a "random walk."66
3. The Efficient Market and the Random Walk Theory
A third major approach to investing is the Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis. The hypothesis is concerned with "how successful the mar-
ket is in establishing security prices that reflect the 'worth' of the securi-
ties, success being defined in terms of whether the market incorporates
all new information in its security prices in a rapid and unbiased man-
ner."67 Proponents of the hypothesis note that a primary consequence of
true efficiency should be that most investors, if not all, are precluded
from being able to systematically outperform the market. This in turn
has evolved into the random walk theory, which holds that since price
movements of particular stocks are random, no effective systematic way
exists to predict which stocks will be the winners and which will be the
losers.
may be no time to act. For a discussion of strong form efficiency, see infra text accompanying
note 75.
64. MALKIEL, supra note 19, at 118-19.
65. See id. at 133-34.
66. See id. at 134-36.
67. SIMON M. KEANE, STOCK MARKET EFFICIENCY-THEORY, EVIDENCE AND IMPLI-
CATIONS 9 (1983); see, eg., ANTHONY J. CURLEY & ROBERT M. BEAR, INVESTMENT ANAL-
YSIS AND MANAGEMENT 7-8 (1979); JAMES H. LORIE & MARY T. HAMILTON, THE STOCK
MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 70-93 (1973); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Mar-
kets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383-84, 387-88 (1970); Irwin
Friend, The Economic Consequences of the Stock Market, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 212, 212-14
(1972); Christopher Saari, Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory,
and Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1031, 1035-41 (1977). For critical
views of the efficient capital market hypothesis, see Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser,
Efficient Markets, Costly Information and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 770-72
(1985); William K.S. Wang, Some Arguments That the Stock Market is Not Efficient, 19 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 341, 343, 401-02 (1986).
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The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis is firmly entrenched in the
law of securities regulation. Consider, for example, the fraud-on-the-
market presumption of reliance.68 When a material misrepresentation or
omission is made with regard to a publicly traded security, courts pre-
sume that the price has been affected. 9 The fraud-on-the-market pre-
sumption is derived from the judicial belief in the hypothesis. In an
efficient market, stock prices reflect the total mix of available informa-
tion; if someone injects material misinformation into that mix, it follows
that the price should be adversely affected.7" Accordingly, in a suit
charging securities fraud, once materiality is shown the burden rests with
the defendant to show that the price was not so affected. 1
Scholars have developed three forms of the efficient market theory.
The market is "weakly" efficient if prices fully reflect the information
implied by all prior price movements.72 In a weakly efficient market, a
change in price would be triggered only by new information or a new
economic event. The "weak" form of the efficiency has, thus, been ex-
plained as follows: "The history of stock-price movements contains no
useful information that will enable an investor consistently to outperform
a buy-and-hold-strategy in managing a portfolio."73
The market is "semi-strong" efficient if prices respond instantane-
ously and accurately to newly published information.74 In a semi-strong
efficient market, the price implicitly has already taken into account any
public information about the economy or the company, such as the fac-
68. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d
462, 468 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983); see, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Effi-
cient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. Rnv.
907, 917-19 (1989). See generally 2 THOMAS L. HAZEN, LAW OF SECURMTES REGULATION
§ 13.5, at 700-02 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the fraud-on-the-market theory in relation to proof
of the reliance element).
69. See, e.g., Levinson, 485 U.S. at 241-42.
70. As one court has summarized the efficient capital market hypothesis: "[E]conomists
have now amassed sufficient empirical data to justify a present belief that widely-followed se-
curities of larger corporations are 'efficiently' priced: the market price of stocks reflects all
available public information-and hence necessarily, any material misrepresentations as well."
In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 144 (N.D. Tex. 1980); see, eg., Levinson, 485 U.S. at 247
(applying fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance); 2 HAZEN, supra note 68, § 13.5, at
700.
71. Levinson, 485 U.S. at 241-42.
72. KEANE, supra note 67, at 10.
73. MALKIEL, supra note 19, at 137.
74. KEANE, supra note 67, at 10. But see Dan Givoly & Josef Lakonishok, The Informa-
tion Content of Financial Analysts' Forecasts of Earnings: Some Evidence on Semi-Strong Inef-
ficiency, 1 J. AccT. & ECON. 165, 166 (1979) (discussing the relationship between financial




tors generally considered by fundamental analysts. lit follows that pro-
fessional analysis of this data to discover deviations from the stock's
intrinsic value is futile because the stock's price supposedly equals its
intrinsic value.
Under the "strong" form of the efficient market theory prices instan-
taneously and accurately reflect not only all publicly available data but
all relevant information that can be known.75 In a strongly efficient mar-
ket it would not be possible, even for insiders, to trade profitably on their
information because the insider's usual advantage-unique access to in-
formation-does not exist.
A majority of scholars accepts the efficient market and random walk
theories, although some have voiced their reservations.7" While much of
the empirical evidence to date indicates that markets are not strongly
efficient, empirical support does exist for the weak and semi-strong forms
of the efficient market theory. 7 While studies and anecdotal experiences
support the claim that by using various trading strategies, investors can
make short-term profits," many observers assert that these strategies do
not perform consistently.79
Critics of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis point out weak-
nesses in some of the theory's underlying assumptions. First, all inves-
tors do not play by the same ground rules when picking investments,
which itself hampers market efficiency. Many investors ignore or are not
aware of the hypothesis and utilize fundamental and technical analysis in
selecting securities that they expect to outperform the market. Accord-
ing to adherents of the hypothesis, fundamental and technical analysis
are not rational investment strategies because they do not take into ac-
count investment risks that are already factored into the market.
A second criticism is that the hypothesis is based on the premise
that the market values securities based on all publicly available informa-
tion. It is difficult to believe that all information is immediately disclosed
to everyone.80 Furthermore, the efficient market theory assumes that
75. KEANE, supra note 67, at 10.
76. See, eg., Wang, supra note 67, at 341; see also MALKIEL, supra note 19, at 183-85
(expressing reservations about the strong and semi-strong forms of efficiency); Stout, supra
note 11, at 1259-68 (implying that the efficient market theory cannot explain large takeover
premiums).
77. HARLOW, supra note 17, at 32; MALKiEL, supra note 19, at 137.
78. See George M. Frankfurter & Christopher G. Lamoureux, Stock Selection and Tim-
ing-A New Look at Market Efficiency, 15 J. Bus. FIN. & AcCT., Autumn 1988, at 385-400;
Edgar Peters, 'Fractals' Put Order in Chaos, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, April 3, 1989, at
18, 23.
79. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
80. Even if one argues that this is true for the large publicly traded corporations, it would
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
"no one possesses monopolistic power over the market and that stock
recommendations based on unfounded beliefs do not lead to large buy-
ing."'" With the proliferation of institutional investors, 2 however, it is
quite possible that an erroneous belief about a stock can lead to large
amounts of cash flowing in and out of the market. To that extent, the
self-fulfilling prophecy explanation maintained by the technicians may be
credible.8 3
Critics also contend that, insofar as the efficient market theory de-
pends on the quick and accurate dissemination of information, it is possi-
ble, at least in theory, for an analyst with exceptional intelligence to
evaluate the information and form superior predictions about a stock's
prospects.8 4
Finally, opponents of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis assert
that the theory ignores the psychology of investors.85 One can hardly
doubt the significance of investor psychology on the market in light of
what might be dubbed the "October syndrome." The stock market's
worst and most volatile performances have occurred during the month of
October. On the fiftieth anniversary of the 1929 Wall Street crash, the
Dow Jones Industrial Average over five days suffered a 58.62 point de-
cline, a loss of seven percent in value.8 6 Eight years later, on October 19,
1987, the market experienced its worst day ever, with the Dow Jones
Industrial Average declining by almost one-third. 7 Then, just two years
later, on Friday October 13, 1989, the Dow average dropped 190 points
not follow for the many small companies that, although publicly traded, are not actively fol-
lowed by professional investors.
81. MALKIEL, supra note 19, at 184.
82. See, eg., Lowry, supra note 26, at 23-35.
83. See, e.g., MALKIEL, supra note 19, at 117.
84. Id. at 185.
85. Although economists would scoff at it, additional evidence of irrationality can be
found in behaviorist literature. See, eg., Michael Klausner, Sociological Theory and the Behav-
ior of Financial Markets, in SOCIAL DYNAMIcS, supra note 19, at 57. For example, under
cognitive dissonance theory, investor behavior is likely to be affected by the stress that results
for the investor who buys a stock with the hope of gain but watches the price drop (or the
investor who sells a stock and then watches it rise). Id. at 71-75. It has thus been suggested
that not all of the answers to stock market performance lie in economic analysis. See, e.g.,
DAVID N. DREMAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE STOCK MARKET 102-13 (1977); Baker, supra
note 26, at 107.
A significant body of literature suggests that markets are not as rational as many econo-
mists assume. See, e.g., Charles R. Plott, Rational Choice in Experiment Markets, in RA-
TIONAL CHOICE 117, 139-41 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1986). For
example, even proponents of the rational choice theory have acknowledged that not all market
activity is rational. Id. at 141.
86. See, e.g., Karen W. Arensen, The Great Crash of '79, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 14, 1979, § 3,
at 1, 18.
87. For a discussion of recent market volatility, see infra text accompanying notes 142-59.
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(nearly seven percent) with most of the loss occurring in the last ninety
minutes of trading.8 Many economists might argue that these precipi-
tous declines revealed an efficient filtering of investors' fears. Given the
rapidity of the declines, however, it is difficult to characterize these
downturns and the corresponding investors' fears solely in terms of ra-
tional economic behavior.
What then is the effect of irrational investment decisions on market
price? Economists refer to irrational investment behavior as "noise'
which interferes with efficiency. 9 It appears to be a given in efficiency
analysis that markets are noisy.
Noise may be defined in various ways.9" "Noise traders" make the
market attractive for those who trade on information.9 However, noise
traders may overreact to information, thus forcing inordinate attention
on short-term performance and increasing volatility.92 By causing the
market to depart from the direction in which quiet efficiency otherwise
would lead it, noise presents the opportunity to correct market inefficien-
cies by entering into corresponding transactions. Proponents of the Effi-
cient Capital Market Hypothesis contend that noise is treated like any
other information-that is, it is factored into market prices. 93
As a footnote to the discussion of efficient market theory, some men-
tion should be made of the random walk theory. This theory does not, as
some critics have claimed, state that stock prices move aimlessly and er-
ratically and are insensitive to changes in fundamental information. On
the contrary, it maintains that the market is efficient, with prices moving
so rapidly in response to new information that investors cannot consist-
88. For a discussion of the "Friday the 13th" and the rebound on the following Monday,
see infra text accompanying notes 152-54.
89. See, e.g., Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 529-30 (1986).
90. See, e.g., Anat R. Admati, A Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium for Multi-Asset
Securities Markets, 53 ECONOMETRICA 629, 653-55 (1985); Black, supra note 89, at 529-30; J.
Bradford De Long et al., The Size and Incidence of the Losses from Noise Trading, 44 J. FIN.
681, 683 (1989); Larry J. Merville & Dan R. Pieptea, Stock-Price Volatility, Mean-Reverting
Diffusion, and Noise, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 212 (1989); Thomas Russell & Richard Thaler,
The Relevance of Quasi Rationality in Competitive Markets, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 1071, 1075
(1985).
91. Black, supra note 89, at 530-32.
92. See William H. Gross, Selling the Noise, 15 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Spring 1989, at 61
(finding that noise in bond market causes short-term price volatility in excess of variations in
value).
93. See, e.g., Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53
ECONOMETRICA 1315, 1316 (1985). But see Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the
Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 393, 403-04 (1980)
(redefining efficient market theories by comparing differences in noise amounts with informed
and uninformed traders).
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ently buy or sell fast enough to benefit.94 Hence, the only profitable in-
vestment strategy is to buy and hold randomly selected stocks over a
long period of time.95 Although the random walk theory was built on
acceptance of efficient markets, the random walk is not an inevitable con-
sequence of efficient markets, at least for markets that are only weakly
efficient.
While efficient market proponents assume that information filters
into the market in a smooth and orderly fashion and that resulting price
moves are gradual, some evidence shows that this is not the case; there-
fore, it has been suggested that securities prices may be "excessively sen-
sitive to current information,, 96 while another study concluded that
"stock markets behave as if they have a finite time horizon."9 7 If these
conclusions are accurate, such overreaction to short-term information
presents opportunities for profit.98 This phenomenon is an additional in-
dication that in the current market climate, investors are focusing unduly
on the short term. It also means that long-term investors whose timing is
wrong can be whipsawed by the market's wide swings.
4. A Random Walk to Chaos?
Before leaving the random walk theory, an emerging theory de-
94. See, e.g., James M. Poterba & Lawrence H. Summers, Mean Reversion in Stock Prices:
Evidence and Implications, 22 J. FIN. ECON. 27, 29-31 (1988).
95. Modem portfolio theory postulates that individual stock selection cannot beat the
market and that the best strategy is to buy and hold a large diversified portfolio. Acceptance
of the buy and hold strategy suggests that there is no economically rational way to invest in the
short-term market. Nevertheless, there has been a proliferation of derivative investments that
by their nature are short term. Does the acceptance of the random walk and modern portfolio
theories by many economists mean that the authorities should limit the availability of futures
and options in order to minimize the skewing of the market toward short-term events? This
certainly is'not the tenor of the current literature, nor is it the force driving current regulatory
philosophy. Most of the economic literature maintains that options and futures increase mar-
ket efficiency. If the options and futures markets focus on the short-term, how can this sup-
posed efficiency be compatible with the random walk and modem portfolio theory?
96. Joerding, supra note 27, at 72.
97. Id. at 80. The study examined four particular stocks-Exxon, General Electric, Inter-
national Telephone & Telegraph, and Texaco-and found that, even when taking a very opti-
mistic basis of predicting future value, the market's time horizon never exceeded 196 months
and in many cases was much shorter. For example, the price history of General Electric stock
for the period studied was found not to be a rational predictor of future value beyond 37
months. Id. This does not comport with the market as an efficient discounter of present value
unless one assumes that the market believed General Electric would no longer be in business
after three years.
98. See, e.g., DAVID D. DREMEN, CONTRARIAN INVESTMENT STRATEGY: THE PSY-
CHOLOGY OF STOCK MARKET SUCCESS 153-54 (1979). The profit would be captured by iden-
tifying the overreaction and investing in such a way as to capitalize on the market's eventual
return to the "proper" valuation.
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serves mention: chaos theory.9 9 Chaos theory holds that close analysis
will reveal order in patterns which otherwise appear to be disorderly or
random. Adherents to the chaos theory speak in terms of the "strange
attractor"-the phenomenon that transfers disorder into some underly-
ing theme or pattern. I°
Chaos theory is gaining popularity in the hard sciences,"' and some
economic theorists are now utilizing it to support their belief that market
activity may be explained as chaotic rather than random.'"2 Several re-
cent studies suggest that the financial market's performance over time
may be patterned in ways that elude standard statistical tests.'0 3 As one
authority explains: "In chaos theory, an emerging field in the science of
nonlinear dynamics, one finds a hidden pattern in seemingly random
events, order in what appears to be disorder, predictability in apparent
irregularity."" 4 Accordingly, some have suggested that in the financial
99. There has been increasingly widespread scholarly acceptance of chaos theory. See,
e.g., ERICH JANTsCH, THE SELF-ORGANIZING UNIVERSE: SCIENTIFIC AND HUMAN IMPLI-
CATIONS OF THE EMERGING PARADIGM OF EVOLUTION 6-9 (1980); BENOIT B. MANDEL-
BROT, THE FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF NATURE 193-98 (1977); G. NICOLiS & I. PRIGOGINE,
SELF ORGANIZATION IN NONEQUILIBRIUM SYSTEMS: FROM DISSIPATIVE STRUCTURES TO
ORDER THROUGH FLUCTUATIONS 1-14, 474 (1977); JOHN S. NICOLIS, DYNAMICS OF HIER-
ARCHICAL SYSTEMS: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 2 (1986); HEINZ-OTrO PEITGEN & PE-
TER H. RICHTER, THE BEAUTY OF FRACTALS 24, 157 (1986); H. BRUCE STEWART & J.
MICHAEL THOMPSON, NONLINEAR DYNAMICS AND CHAOS 1-8, 197 (1986). For an excellent
layperson's explanation of chaos theory, see JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS-MAKING A NEW SCI-
ENCE 1-7 (1987).
100. See, eg., Celso Gregobi et al., Chaos, Strange Attractors, and Fractal Basin Boundaries
in Nonlinear Dynamics, 238 SCIENCE 632, 632 (1987).
101. In a scientific world that was once thought to be based on orderly systems, complex
systems are now viewed as chaotic by many scientists. When used in this sense, chaos does not
mean that there is no pattern present.
102. See, eg., GLEICK, supra note 99, at 4, 83; Peter J. Brennan, Software Advance Distills
"Order" From Market "Chaos," WALL ST. COMPUTER REV., March 6, 1989, at 14, 14-16;
Barry B. Burr, Chaos: New Market Theory Emerges, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, July 10,
1989, at 3; Victoria Griffith & Henry Southworth, Chaos Theory, BANKER, Jan. 1990, at 51;
Peters, supra note 78, at 23; H. Richard Priesmeyer & Kibok Balk, A Potential New Planning
Tool-Discovering the Patterns of Chaos, PLAN. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 14; Michael J.
Radzicki, Institutional Dynamics, Deterministic Chaos, and Self-Organizing Systems,'24 3.
ECON. ISSUES 57, 57-58 (1990); Guy Routh, Economics and Chaos, CHALLENGE, July-Aug.
1989, at 47; Lawrence S. Speidell, As a Science, Chaos Can Put Things in Order, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENT AGE, Dec. 12, 1988, at 25; John D. Sterman, Deterministic Chaos in an Experi-
mental Economic System, 12 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1, 1-3, 47-48 (1989).
103. See, eg., William J. Baumol & Jess Benhabib, Chaos: Significance, Mechanism, and
Economic Applications, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 77, 100 (1989); William A. Brock, Distinguishing
Random and Deterministic Systems: Abridged Version, 40 J. ECON. THEORY 168 (1986); Rich-
ard H. Day, Irregular Growth Cycles, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 406, 413 (1982); see also Robert
Savit, Nonlinearities and Chaotic Effects in Options Prices, 9 J. FUTURES MARKETS 507, 507
(1989) (suggesting that chaos is found in self-regulating systems such as the financial and com-
modities markets).
104. Burr, supra note 102, at 3.
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
markets, as with any complex system, performance lies somewhere be-
tween order, which is predictable, and randomness, which is not. 105 The
fact that patterns can be identified in prices that at one level seem ran-
dom does not necessarily contradict a belief in the weak form of market
efficiency. 106
In contrast to the random walk theory, which posits that stock
prices are random and that movement is determined by systematic risk
with individual securities fluctuating according to their volatility (or
"beta"), 10 7 chaos theory maintains that what appears to be random is
not, and that patterns may be discerned. However, these patterns may
not be predictable in advance. Thus, chaos theory may not provide any
basis for investment selection since future movements may be as unpre-
dictable as they would under the random walk theory. Nonetheless, ad-
herence to the chaos theory necessarily undermines belief in the
randomness of stock prices. If stock prices are not in fact random, then
investment strategies that flow from the random walk theory must be
reconsidered.
C. Responses to Criticisms of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis:
Portfolio Theory and the Capital Asset Pricing Model
The academic community has attempted to confront some of the
criticisms hurled at the efficient market theory. Proponents of the hy-
pothesis concede that selecting individual securities has proved a success-
ful strategy for many investors.10 8 Others contend, however, that this
method of beating the market does not depend on superior intelligence,
information, or charting, but instead is a result of incurring greater risk.
As Dean Malkiel explains, "[r]isk, and risk alone, determines the degree
to which returns will be above or below average, and thus decides the
valuation of any stock relative to the market."" °
Modern portfolio theory developed from the idea that only a will-
ingness to take greater risk will earn investors greater returns. An inves-
105. See Bruce I. Jacobs & Kenneth N. Levy, The Complexity of the Stock Market, J.
PORTFOLIO MGMT., Fall 1989, at 19. For example, a cyclical pattern was identified in a col-
lective study of the performance of five stocks which, on an individual basis, appeared to per-
form randomly. See Marlene Cherchi & Arthur Havenner, Cointegration and Stock Prices:
The Random Walk on Wall Street Revisited, 12 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 333, 345
(1988).
106. Frankfurter & Lamoureaux, supra note 78, at 399. The finding of weak efficiency is
based on the assumption that investors are risk neutral. Others have suggested that investors
are, in fact, risk averse. See LeRoy & LaCivita, supra note 29, at 538-39, 546.
107. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.




tor who assumes more risk expects to be rewarded with higher returns. 110
The theory posits that investing in a diversified portfolio reduces total
risk and allows investors to earn consistent returns. 1' True diversifica-
tion is achieved by having in the portfolio stocks that are not all con-
trolled by the same economic variables." 2 In reality, minimizing risk
through diversification is often difficult because stocks tend to move in
tandem. Some risk can be limited through application of the theory un-
derlying the Capital Asset Pricing Model." 3
The Capital Asset Pricing Model asserts that the total risk of a stock
is actually the sum of two different types of risk. One type is systematic
risk, or beta, which arises from the basic variability of stock prices and
the tendency for all stocks to move with the market to some extent.'
While all stocks are affected by systematic risk in the same way, some are
affected more than others.115 This accounts for some stocks having high
betas while others have low betas.
The remaining variability is called unsystematic risk." 6 This risk
results from factors peculiar to an individual company or industry. Un-
systematic risk can be eliminated through diversification. Unsystematic
risk factors that negatively affect one company may positively affect an-
other. 11 7 For example, securities issued by oil companies may increase
with the price of crude oil while airline stock prices will simultaneously
decrease because of higher fuel costs. Since unsystematic risk can be
eliminated through diversification, modem portfolio theory holds that
the market will not compensate investors for that risk.1"'
Systematic risk, in contrast, cannot be eliminated through diversifi-
110. Paul G. Haskell, The Prudent Person Rule for Trustee Investment and Modern Portfo-
lio Theory, 69 N.C. L. REv. 87, 101 (1990); Franco Modigliani & Gerald A. Pogue, An Intro-
duction to Risk and Return; Concepts and Evidence, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.-Apr. 1974, at 68,
68; see, eg., Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 67, at 778; John H. Langbein & Richard A.
Posner, Market Funds and Trust Investment Law, 1 AM. B. FOUND. Rns. J. 1, 8 (1976). For
an excellent explanation of risk and portfolio theory, see Haskell, supra, at 100-04.
111. MALKIEL, supra note 19, at 223-25.
112. Id. at 227.
113. Id. at 228-30.
114. Id. at 229. "Systematic risk ... captures the reaction of individual stocks (or portfo-
lios) to general market swings." Id. Beta is the numerical description of systematic risk. Id.
115. Haskell, supra note 110, at 101; see R. A. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK
AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS 111, 125 (2d ed. 1983); MALKIEL, supra note 19, at
229-30.
116. MALKIEL, supra note 19, at 230. Unsystematic risk is also referred to as "specific" or
"residual" risk. Haskell, supra note 110, at 101; see BREALEY, supra note 115, at 113, 117,
125; MALKIEL, supra note 19, at 231-32.
117. See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 67, at 777; Haskell, supra note 110, at 101.
118. See Haskell, supra note 110, at 101.
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cation and thus will command a risk premium.119 Investors will not ben-
efit by assuming risk that could have been eliminated by portfolio
diversification. Thus, an investor need only invest in a large diversified
portfolio with a high beta to earn higher rates of return.
120
Modem portfolio theory and the Capital Asset Pricing Model first
evolved in the 1970s and gained instant popularity.121 As additional evi-
dence on beta was collected, however, it became apparent that the actual
relationship between beta and rate of return is not precisely what the
theory had predicted.' 22 In addition, the relationship between beta and
investment return has proven undependable in the short run. 23 Finally,
beta itself does not appear stable from period to period. 124
The foregoing evidence suggests that no easy method is available to
assess risk and predict future returns with any certainty. Hence, many
observers conclude that until a better approach is proven, the most prof-
itable investment strategy is to buy and hold a randomly selected portfo-
lio over a long period of time-in other words, the random walk theory.
In light of this conclusion, the following question arises: To what extent,
if any, does the proliferation of short-term trading strategies affect this
lesson?
119. As Professor Haskell explains:
A fundamental principle of contemporary economic thinking is that the marketplace
compensates the buyer for systematic risk but does not compensate the buyer for
specific risk. Systematic risk is unavoidable; almost all stocks covary positively, al-
beit in different degrees, in relation to that risk. Expected return is the riskless rate
(short-term U.S. government debt) plus a rate determined in accordance with the
degree of systematic risk.
Id; see BREALEY, supra note 115, at 113-14; MALKIEL, supra note 19, at 230-32.
120. See Haskell, supra note 110, at 102 ('The larger the portfolio, the closer the specific
risk factor of the portfolio can approach zero."). The beta calculation is a comparison between
the movements of the individual stock (or portfolio) and the movements of the market as a
whole. If the stock has a beta of two, for example, this means when the market goes up 10%
the stock will go up 20%. If the stock is perceived as having a high beta, its price will adjust to
provide higher returns. Investors would not buy securities with higher risk without the expec-
tation of higher returns.
An individual investor who purchases only high beta stocks cannot gain the same advan-
tage unless she can achieve the same measure of diversification as the large portfolios of institu-
tional investors. See id. at 102-03.
121. MALKIEL, supra note 19, at 236; Harvey E. Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and In-
vestment Management Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 721, 797
(1976).
122. MALKIEL, supra note 19, at 242-55.
123. Id. at 245-48.
124. Id. at 222.
SHORT-TERM/LONG-TERM DICHOTOMY
III. DERIVATIVE INVESTMENTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON MARKETS
AND REGULATORY PHILOSOPHY
A. The Rise of Derivative Instruments and Their Effect on Market
Volatility
Over the past ten years, a major shift in the investment community
has taken place. Although the futures markets have for a long time pro-
vided various hedging opportunities for both commodities merchants and
investors, it is only within the past ten years that such strategies have
become commonplace in capital and other financial markets. Similarly, a
veritable explosion of options and other derivative investment vehicles
has reverberated throughout financial markets. 25 These instruments
have contributed significantly to shifting the markets' focus from long-
term to short-term strategies.
The most straightforward of these derivative investment vehicles are
"put" 126 and "call" 1" options on individual securities. These instru-
ments enable investors to enter into an option contract to either buy or
sell a security at a designated exercise price (or "strike price") prior to a
designated expiration date without buying the security outright. In
purchasing a call option, the option holder has taken a "bullish" position
in the underlying security-he or she is hoping that the price will rise;
conversely, the seller of a call option is betting that the price will not rise.
Similarly, the purchaser of a put option is hoping that the price of the
security will fall. Since options cost only a fraction of the price of the
underlying security, they can be used as a vehicle for leveraged investing
with a limited amount of up-front capital. Options also are useful for
various hedging strategies.
12
125. See, e.g., 1 HAZEN, supra note 68, § 1.5.1, at 43.
126. A "put" option is a contract under which the option holder (the purchaser) has the
right to sell the underlying stock to the option writer (the seller of the option) at the designated
exercise price any time prior to the expiration date. A put option is "in the money" when the
exercise price is at or above the current market price for the underlying security.
127. A "call" option is a contract between the writer of the option (the seller) and the
option holder (the purchaser) under which the holder of the call option has the right to "call"
the underlying stock away from the option writer at the exercise price at any time prior to the
expiration date. A call option is priced based on the relationship of the underlying security's
current market price to the exercise price on the option, and is "in the money" when the
exercise price is at or below the current market price of the underlying security.
Publicly traded options on securities currently have expiration dates that are tied to the
third Friday of the designated month. Hence, an ABC Corp. $40 March 1992 call option
would give the owner (buyer) of the option the right to purchase 100 shares of ABC stock at
$40 per share (plus applicable commissions) any time prior to the close of trading on the third
Friday in March 1992.
128. Consider the following example:
[Ain investor owning 1000 shares of ABC Co. stock which is currently trading at $12
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In the 1970s, the trading of "put" and "call" options on individual
securities became more widespread, leading several of the national secur-
ities exchanges to specialize in options rather than equity and debt securi-
ties. 29 The options (and now the futures) markets have expanded
beyond options on individual securities to index options and futures.
These relatively new instruments permit investors to take investment po-
sitions in baskets of securities as represented by a particular grouping.,
30
Stock options, index options, and index futures may have increased
per share may want to limit the risk of a price decline. In such a case, an appropriate
hedge strategy would be to buy put options with a strike price of $10 per share. This
would guarantee that at any time until the expiration date the investor could sell the
stock for $10 per share. Buying the puts will cause the investor to incur the cost of
the premium that the market has placed on the put and thereby the investor increases
his or her total cost but limits the risk of loss.
1 HAZEN, supra note 68, § 1.51, at 43.
129. The Chicago Board Options Exchange is a national securities exchange registered
under § 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1988), and trades exclu-
sively in options. The Philadelphia and Pacific Stock Exchanges trade relatively few stocks but
list many options. Additionally, the American Stock Exchange has many active options list-
ings. For a discussion of the history of the securities options market, see REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL STUDY OF THE OPTIONS MARKETS TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMIS-
SION 1-9 (1978). Since options are contracts between two people, they cannot be traded in the
same manner as equity and debt securities. Publicly traded options involve the listing of the
various put and call options on a national securities exchange, with the Options Clearing Cor-
poration acting as a clearinghouse that matches the purchasers and sellers of the options.
130. An index option operates much like an option on a particular security. While an
option on a security involves the right to purchase or sell that particular security, an index
option involves the right to purchase or sell a basket of stocks; the aggregate price of the stocks
in the basket determines the price of the option. An index future is similarly based on a basket
of stocks. However, an index future does more than give the holder an option to purchase or
sell; it creates an actual contractual delivery obligation, much the same as a futures contract on
an agricultural commodity. The delivery obligation is illusory, since investment positions in
futures contracts are generally "closed out" by purchasing an off-setting contract.
Futures contracts traditionally have existed for agricultural commodities, crude oil and
derivatives, and precious metals trading, but more recently have expanded into government
securities, foreign currencies, stock indexes, and other financial futures. See generally 1 PHIL-
LIP M. JOHNSON & THOMAS L. HAZEN, COMMODITIES REGULATION § 1.01, at 3-6 (2d ed.
1989) (tracing the expansion of the definition of "commodity" from specific agricultural prod-
ucts to any tangible or intangible subject of futures trading). The mechanics of a futures con-
tract are as follows: A June gold future contract obligates the seller of the contract to deliver a
designated amount of gold to the purchaser on a specified delivery date at the market price on
that date. Futures contracts are priced with reference to the current price of the underlying
commodity and the investment community's prediction as to the likelihood of price increases
at the time of expiration.
Originally, futures contracts were envisioned as a way for farmers and other merchants to
hedge their positions-for example, by selling corn futures against the crops in the ground.
Today, however, the futures markets are dominated by investors. Through the market process
known as "offset," a technique under which investors purchase (or sell) an off-setting futures
contract prior to the delivery date, more than 95% of delivery obligations are extinguished.
Stock index futures operate the same as future contracts on hard commodities, except that the
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market volatility. Moreover, the prevalence of these investments and
various trading strategies has caused investors to focus more on short-
term rather than long-term investments. As a general rule, the longest
publicly traded option lasts for nine months. Most options and futures
trading is done on an even faster basis. For example, many futures or
options trading strategies include quick turn-around trades, frequently
taking place on the same day.131 Many of these strategies involve hedg-
ing, straddling, or spreading an option or futures contract against the
underlying security or basket of securities. These factors make it clear
that short-term strategies not only dominate the options and futures mar-
kets; they have also come to play a major role in, if not dominate, the
equity securities markets.
Many observers claim that the availability of derivative investment
vehicles enhances market efficiency. 32 In fact, a number of studies con-
ducted during the early and mid-1980s indicated that stock market vola-
tility did not increase with the introduction of futures and options.
133
delivery obligation is not defined in terms of the underlying basket of securities. Rather, it is
for an amount of cash to be determined by reference to the applicable index.
Although stock index futures involve risks normally associated with securities and securi-
ties options, they are regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Repeated
jurisdictional battles have occurred between the SEC and the CFTC over the regulation of
derivative financial investments. See, eg., Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537,
539, 543-45 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3214 (1990). See generally 1 HAZEN, supra
note 68, § 1.4.1, at 17-20 (discussing SEC and CFTC jurisdictional disputes, as well as subse-
quent jurisdictional accords and legislation); 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra, § 4.37, at 265-75
(same).
131. See, e.g., 3 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 130, § 5.45, at 127.
132. E.g., Franklin R. Edwards, Stock Index Futures and Stock Market Volatility: Evi-
dence and Implications, COMMOD. L. LETTER, Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 3,4-5. As other commenta-
tors have explained:
Countering this general perception that the stock market has become more volatile in
recent years, certain empirical analyses tend to indicate that, on balance, stock mar-
ket volatility has not been particularly high over the last two years when stock index
futures and option activity has increased dramatically. Further, significant reversals
in actual stock index levels have not occurred in the one- or two-day periods follow-
ing sharp changes in the indices on several non-expiration days in 1986. This sug-
gests that such changes have not been aberrations relative to market fundamentals.
Some analysts have thus characterized stock index derivative markets as more finely
tuned and quickly responsive measures of overall stock market sentiment rather than
as independent causes of changing stock market prices.
Ronald B. Hobson & Paula A. Tosini, Regulatory Issues Relating to Stock Index Futures and
Option Markets, COMMOD. L. LETTER, Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 1, 13 (footnotes omitted).
133. FEDERAL RESERVE BD. ET AL., A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS ON THE ECONOMY OF
TRADING IN FUTURES AND OPTIONS 207-209 (1984); see also REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS I-1, I-5 (1988) [hereinafter BRADY REPORT] ("[lit
is difficult to argue that the recent increases in volatility represent anything more significant
than normal cyclical fluctuations .... The conclusion is that prior to October 19, [1987,] there
was no systematic evidence to suggest that volatility was at a historical peak."); W. Gary
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Since volatility is considered a sign of inefficiency, these studies would
seem to confirm that the increase in derivative investments has not un-
dermined the markets.
Stock index futures and options were introduced in 1982 and 1983.
As the 1980s progressed, an increasing number of traders had access to
more sophisticated computer technology than had been available in the
past. Concurrently, the markets experienced the development and rapid
increase in the use of various new trading strategies such as program
trading and index arbitrage. It was not until 1986 that observers began
to worry about the impact that computerized trading would have on the
market. 134
Program trading involves the use of computers to track price dis-
crepancies between index futures contracts, index options, and the cash
value of the stocks underlying the indexes. When a discrepancy appears
between the option or futures premium and the cash value of the index,
the trader will lock in a profit by arbitraging one against the other. For
example, if the futures price is discounted below the cash value, then the
trader who is long in stocks will begin a "sell program" in which she will
sell the stock and buy the discounted futures contract. Conversely, when
the futures are trading at a premium above the cash value, the trader will
begin a "buy program" which consists of selling the futures contract and
buying the stocks that comprise the index.135
Simpson & Timothy C. Ireland, The Impact of Financial Futures on the Cash Market for
Treasury Bills, 20 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 371, 372, 374 (1985) (arguing that
futures trading initially reduces cash market volatility); Stephen J. Turnovsky, Futures Mar-
kets, Private Storage and Price Stabilization, 12 J. PUB. ECON. 301, 312-13, 325 (1979) (con-
tending that efficient futures markets stabilize spot prices).
134. See David Sanger, Wall Street's Tomorrow Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1986, § 3,
at 1. Prophetically, this article was published exactly one year before the 1987 market break.
135. For descriptions of program trading and portfolio insurance, see Simon Benninga &
Marshall Blume, On the Optimality of Portfolio Insurance, 40 J. FIN. 1341 (1985); M.J. Bren-
nan & R. Solanki, Optimal Portfolio Insurance, 16 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 279,
279-80 (1981); F.J. Gould, Stock Index Futures: The Arbitrage Cycle and Portfolio Insurance,
FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 48, 55; Joanne M. Hill & Frank J. Jones, Equity Trading,
Program Trading, Portfolio Insurance, Computer Trading and All That, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
July-Aug. 1988, at 29; Jonathan R. Macey et al., Restrictions on Short Sales: An Analysis of the
Uptick Rule and its Role in View of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74 CORNELL L.
REV. 799, 822-27 (1989); John J. Merrick, Portfolio Insurance With Stock Index Futures, 8 J.
FUTURES MARKETS 441, 441-42 (1988); see also Hobson & Tosini, supra note 132, at 2, 11
(discussing the relationship of regulatory issues and option markets); Gene G. Marcial, Playing
a Roller-Coaster Market, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 29, 1986, at 94, 94-95 (explaining the applications
of portfolio insurance); Pamela Sebastian, How Program Trading Works and Why it Causes
Controversy in the Stock Market, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1986, at A19 (discussing questions and
answers on the mechanics and effects of program trading); cf. H. Patrick Faust & Ted Doukas,
Taking the Bite out of Stock Index Futures Arbitrage Volatility, FUTURES, Dec. 1985, at 50
(characterizing program trading as a hedging technique that contributes to market reliability).
[Vol. 70
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Some commentators claim that new trading techniques, such as pro-
gram trading and portfolio insurance have contributed to increased vola-
tility. 136 A number of studies support this contention." 7 Others reject
this notion, denying the existence of any causal connection between in-
creased volatility and derivative investments 3 ' and claiming that other
factors are to blame. One such commentator has suggested that "syn-
thetic" stock 3 9 and other "dynamic hedging strategies" increase volatil-
ity whereas index arbitrage does not."4 The explanation for the differing
136. See, eg., Hobson & Tosini, supra note 132, at 13 ("Portfolio insurance programs,
which resemble classic hedging techniques, may exacerbate market swings since such pro-
grams signal a sale of stocks following a decline of a specified index and purchases of stocks
when the value of the index is rising."); see also Hazen, supra note 2, at 801-02 (discussing
views of two influential commentators).
137. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 28, at 1155.
138. Franklin R. Edwards, Does Futures Trading Increase Stock Market Volatility?, FIN.
ANALYSTS J., Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 63. Compare the opinion of these observers with the contrary
conclusion reached by Professor Hans R. Stoll in a study commissioned by the National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers. See Hans R. Stoll & Robert E. Whaley, Volatility and Futures
Message Versus Messenger, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Winter 1988, at 20; Elias Crim, Just How
Volatile is This Stock Market, FUTuREs, May 1986, at 68, 70. Stoll, however, does not point to
all futures activity, simply to futures/cash arbitrage. See Stoll & Whaley, supra, at 20. Fur-
thermore, Stoll does not believe that the evidence warrants major regulatory intervention. Id.
at 22.
139. Synthetic stock is an investment strategy utilizing options whereby an investor can
take the same investment position as if he bought the underlying stock, but on a significantly
more leveraged basis than is possible by merely purchasing the stock on margin. Sanford J.
Grossman, An Analysis of the Implications for Stock and Futures Price Volatility of Program
Trading and Dynamic Hedging Strategies, 61 J. Bus. 275, 276-78, 290-92 (1988). Synthetic
stock is achieved by selling a put option on a security while simultaneously purchasing a call
option with the identical exercise price and expiration date. For example, if ABC stock is
trading in January at $35 per share, an investor may be able to sell 10 June 35 puts (covering
1,000 shares of ABC stock) for $2,000 and buy 10 June 35 calls with the same $35 exercise
price for $3,000. The investor thus has paid $1,000 for her position. Her investment will
increase $1,000 for every one dollar per share increase in ABC stock and will decrease $1,000
for every per share dollar decline. This lets the investor receive the same profit or loss as she
would had she paid $35,000 to purchase the 1,000 shares of ABC stock instead of the 10 call
and 10 put options covering 1,000 shares.
The difference in premium in the ABC example between the put and call options is due to
the market's perception that the ABC stock is more likely to rise than fall between January
and June. Synthetic stock can also be used when the market puts an equal premium on each or
when the market is predicting a decline and places a higher premium on the call but the
investor is willing to take a contrary position. Also, investors might want to take synthetic
stock positions at an exercise price either above or below the current market value for the
underlying stock.
140. The Federal Reserve Board's margin rules prohibit the extension of credit for more
than 50% of the price of the securities to be purchased. Banks and Banking, 12 C.F.R.
§ 220.18 (1991). The rules of the exchanges and the NASD prohibit maintaining a credit.
account when the margin or collateral falls below a certain level calculated on the basis of the
types of securities owned. In no event may the margin drop below twenty-five percent of the
securities owned. See N.Y. STOCK ExCH. R. 431(c), N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2431 (1990);
AM. STOCK EXCH. R. 462(b), Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 1 9472 (1987); NASD R. OF FAIR
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impact on overall market volatility between index arbitrage and synthetic
stock is that index arbitrage is based on the valid assumption that price is
independent of volume; this assumption, however, does not hold when
trading synthetic stock. 141
The volatility issue has prompted numerous studies over the past
few years. An SEC study examining the market decline in September
1986 concluded that the downturn was "a result of changes in investors'
perceptions of fundamental economic conditions, rather than artificial
forces resulting from index-related trading strategies."' 142 The events
leading up to and following the market crash of October 1987 led to
numerous studies of the effects of index arbitrage and computerized trad-
ing on the stock market. 143 In contrast to the results of the SEC's 1986
study, reports by a Presidential Task Force and the SEC established that
program trading contributed significantly to the stock market decline on
October 14-16 and subsequent crash on October 19, 1987.144 These two
PRAC. Art. III, § 30, App. A, § 4, NASD Manual (CCH) 2180A (1984). Brokerage houses
frequently require a higher maintenance level. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 68, § 10.11, at 444.
141. Grossman, supra note 139, at 292.
142. SEC DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, THE ROLE OF INDEX-RELATED TRADING
IN THE MARKET DECLINE OF SEPTEMBER 11 AND 12 1986 (1987).
143. See, eg., BRADY REPORT, supra note 133, at I-I, VIII-13; CFTC Div. OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS AND DIv. OF TRADING AND MKTS., FINAL REPORT ON STOCK INDEX FUTURES
AND CASH MARKET ACTIvITY DURING OCTOBER 1987 (1988); CFTC Div. OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS AND Div. OF TRADING AND MKTS., INTERIM REPORT ON STOCK INDEX FUTURES
AND CASH MARKET ACTIVITY DURING OCTOBER 1987 (1987); MERTON H. MILLER ET AL.,
PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY APPOINTED BY THE CHICAGO
MERCANTILE EXCHANGE TO EXAMINE EVENTS SURROUNDING OCTOBER 19, 1987, 1-2, 5-8
(1987); SEC DIV. OF MKT. REG., REPORT OF THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK §§ 3-9 to
-77 (1988) [hereinafter SEC 1987 MKT. BREAK STUDY]; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, FINANCIAL MARKETS PRELIMINARY OBSERVA-
TIONS ON THE OCTOBER 1987 CRASH 4 (1988); see also ROBERT S. BARRO ET AL., BLACK
MONDAY AND THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 15-20 (1989) (reviewing the October
market crash as well as studies conducted by the Chicago Board of Trade, the Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, the General Accounting
Office, the New York Stock Exchange, the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms
and the Securities Exchange Commission); Eric A. Chiappinelli, Red October: Its Origins,
Consequences, and the Need to Revive the National Market System, 18 SEC. REG. L. J. 144,
144-45 (1990) (mentioning that several studies have been performed and reforms adopted with
regard to the October crash); Robert S. Karmel, The Rashomon Effect in the After-the-Crash
Studies, 21 REv. SEC. & COMMOD. REG. 101, 101-04 (1988) (discussing studies including the
Brady Report, the SEC Report, the GAO report, the CFTC report, the CME report and the
NYSE study); Macey, supra note 135, at 799-804 (analyzing evidence on short sales and the
restrictions placed on short sales that are designed with particular attention to the uptick rule);
Jerry W. Markham & Rita M. Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of1987-The United States
Looks at New Recommendations, 76 GEO. L.J. 1993, 2006-21 (1988) (analyzing the major
proposed regulatory responses to the 1987 market crash); Lewis A. Solomon & Howard B.
Dicker, The Crash of 1987: A Legal and Public Policy Analysis, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 191,
191-93 (1988) (discussing various studies performed on the October crash).
144. BRADY REPORT, supra note 133, at 69; SEC 1987 MKT. BREAK STUDY, supra note
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studies of the 1987 "market break" found that, although the declines
were caused in part by fundamental factors, the decline was enhanced by
program trading.
Both the Presidential Task Force and the SEC study proposed vari-
ous regulatory reforms. The Presidential Task Force report called for a
single regulatory agency that would have oversight responsibility with
regard to the various agencies (including the SEC and CFTC) that cur-
rently have overlapping jurisdiction over the securities markets. 4 ' The
Task Force suggested that the Federal Reserve Board perform this over-
sight function.146 Other proposals included the creation of unified clear-
ing and credit mechanisms, 47 the imposition of unified margin
requirements, 48  and a uniform circuit breaker across the various
markets. 149
143, §§ 3-9 to -17. Consequently, mounting evidence indicates that program trading and stock
index arbitrage increase market volatility. See also David Wilson, Industrials Drop 23.27 on
Selling Linked to Stock-Index Arbitrage, WALL ST. J., July 11, 1990, at C2 (describing how
industrial stocks fell as a result of futures related trading). But see infra text accompanying
notes 150-51 (discussing the results of a recent study commissioned by the New York Stock
Exchange). Nevertheless, it is not surprising that conflict exists over the results of the various
studies. See, e.g., Kevin G. Salwen, CFTC Rakes the SEC's Findings On Mini-Crash as Turf
War Flares, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1990, at Cl; SEC ChiefAccuses CFTC of Distortion in Mini-
Crash Probe, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1990, at C16.
145. BRADY REPORT, supra note 133, at 59-63. In 1990, the President recommended
transferring jurisdiction over stock index futures from the CFTC to the SEC. See White House
to Propose SEC Receive Jurisdiction Over Stock Index Futures, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 19, at 731 (May 11, 1990). Proposals to coordinate CFTC and SEC regulation were con-
tained in early drafts of the Market Reform Act of 1990, but were not enacted. See SENATE
COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, S. REP. No. 300, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
1-7 (1990). The Futures Trading Practices Act of 1991 as adopted by the Senate would take a
functional approach in allocating jurisdiction between the CFTC and the SEC over hybrid
investment vehicles. The bill would allocate jurisdiction to the CFTC if at least 50% of the
overall value or expected change in value of the instrument is attributable to the commodity
component. See SENATE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY, S. REP.
No. 22, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1991).
146. BRADY REPORT, supra note 133, at 69.
147. Id. at 64.
148. Id. at 64-66. But see Dean Furbush & Annette Poulsen, Harmonizing Margins: The
Regulation of Margin Levels in Stock Index Futures Markets, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 873, 875
(1989) (suggesting that the evidence does not warrant a raising of the margin levels for futures
transactions); Fred S. McChesney, Current Excuses for Regulating Futures Transactions:
Avoiding the E-Word, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 902, 902 (1989) (same).
149. BRADY REPORT, supra note 133, at 66-67. Additional support exists for the imposi-
tion of uniform circuit breakers. See, e.g., Circuit Breakers Could Prompt A Review Of Trading
Strategies, SEC. WEEK, Oct. 31, 1988, at 7; CFTC Advisory Committee Members Call For Coor-
dinated Circuit Breakers, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1741 (Nov. 24, 1989);
William C. Freund, One Market, Too Many Sets Of Circuit-Breakers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17,
1989, at A28; SEC, CFTC Approve Coordinated Trading Halts In Volatile Markets, 20 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1580 (Oct. 21, 1988); SIA Unveils Proposal For Cross-market
Circuit Breaker, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 393 (March 16, 1990). Some ob-
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The New York Stock Exchange is also seeking answers to explain
high volatility. A June 1990 study commissioned by the Exchange con-
cluded that program trading was not a factor in wide market fluctua-
tions.150 The report recommended that instead of regulating program
trading, the New York Stock Exchange could control market volatility
through circuit breakers. In light of this recommendation, the New
York Stock Exchange has implemented a pilot program that restricts the
execution of index arbitrage orders on days that the Dow Jones Indus-
trial Average moves fifty points or more from the previous day's close. 151
The SEC issued yet another report in 1990 analyzing the markets'
unprecedented volatility on October 13 and 16, 1989.152 As described in
the report's executive summary:
On October 13, 1989, the nation's securities markets ex-
perienced extraordinary price volatility, losing $190 billion in
value, $160 billion of which was lost in the last [ninety] minutes
[when the Dow Jones Industrial Average experienced 87% of
its daily 190.58 decline]. This decline continued into the open-
ing on Monday, October 16, 1989, when the Dow Jones Indus-
trial Average fell an additional 63.16 points (2.46%) in a steep
sell-off in the first 40 minutes of trading, followed by an even
sharper up-swing to close up 88.12 points (3.43%) from the Oc-
servers have questioned the wisdom of circuit breakers. See, eg., Circuit Breakers May Be
Counterproductive, NASAA Says, SEC. WEEK, May 23, 1988, at 12; Unilateral Circuit-breaker
Mechanisms Could Destabilize Markets, GAO Warns, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at
656 (Apr. 29, 1988).
A number of writers believe that increased regulation of any kind is futile. See, e.g.,
Lawrence Harris, The Dangers of Regulatory Overreaction to the October 1987 Crash, 74 COR-
NELL L. REv. 927, 927 (1989); Breeden Says SEC Should Not Have Emergency Power To Shut
Down Markets, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1491 (Oct. 6, 1989). But see Regan
Calls For Banning Index Arbitrage As First Reform For Financial Markets, 50 Banking Rep.
(BNA) No. 20, at 834-35 (May 16, 1988) (calling for reforms which include index arbitrage
and stricter securities regulation). Some assert that, since the 1987 market break was initiated
in the European trading markets, regulatory reforms aimed solely at markets in the United
States will not solve the problem. David D. Haddock, An Economic Analysis of the Brady
Report: Public Interest, Special Interest, or Rent Extraction?, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 841, 841-
42 (1989).
150. See NYSE Panel Calls For Mandatory Trading Halts In Crisis, Single Regulator, 22
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 896-97 (June 15, 1990).
151. The new rules provide that once the fifty point limit has been reached, individual
transaction orders are to be given priority in execution over those orders entered in connection
with index arbitrage. See SEC Approves NYSE Pilot to Restrict Index Arbitrage if DJA Moves
50 Points, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1089-90 (July 27, 1990). These rules were
invoked on August 3, 1990, shortly after the adoption of the New York Stock Exchange's
restrictions on index arbitrage. See George Anders, Circuit Breakers Help Keep Order In Mar-
ket Route, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1990, at Cl.
152. SEC Div. OF MKT. REG., TRADING ANALYSIS OF OCTOBER 13 AND 16, 1989 (1990)
[hereinafter SEC 1989 TRADING ANALYSIS].
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tober 13 close. The price volatility was accompanied by hourly
trading volume levels that rivalled those of the 1987 market
break. Even more violent price swings were experienced in the
stock index futures markets on both days.
1 5 3
The recovery by the Dow Jones Industrial Average of 46.24% from
its 190.58 point decline on the previous trading day was much greater
than the relatively weaker performance of the broader market.15 4 This
indicates that the bounce-back was limited to a relatively narrow uni-
verse of stocks, and thus, was not indicative of overall market
performance.
In contrast to the conclusion reached in its report of the events of
September 1986,111 the SEC report on the October 1989 decline con-
cluded that excessive volatility was attributable to the presence of deriva-
tive investments. The report identified the following contributors to the
decline: futures trading in speculative accounts; futures trading by op-
tions market makers and major broker dealers, who use futures to hedge;
put writing by large institutions; and the inability of floor traders of index
futures to provide liquidity. The report also found that "[i]ndex arbi-
trage and other program selling significantly accelerated and exacerbated
the market decline."'5 6 Although some continue to disagree, 57 an in-
creasing amount of reliable evidence indicates that many trading strate-
gies employing derivative instruments have added to stock market
volatility.
An interesting contrast to the volatile market swings discussed
above can be found in the reaction to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in the
summer of 1990. In mid-July, the Dow Jones Industrial Average flirted
with the 3000 level. Shortly thereafter, increased fears of inflation and
the invasion of Iraq precipitated a decline to the 2700 level. In the first
four days following the invasion, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell
nearly 190 points. The declines of August 1990 were relatively steady;
the markets were not plagued by the wild gyrations described above.
153. Id. at ES-1.
154. Id. at 1.
155. See supra text accompanying note 142.
156. SEC 1989 TRADING ANALYSIS, supra note 152, at ES-2. At one time, the SEC Chair-
man opposed SEC limits on program trading. Breeden Opposes Letting SEC Limit, Halt Pro-
gram Trading, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1591 (Oct. 27, 1989).
In 1990, the New York Stock Exchange received SEC approval to impose limits on index
arbitrage orders. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
157. The most notable recent example is the position of the CFTC. See, eg., Gramm Says
SEC Crash Report Selectively Omitted Key Data, 22 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at
1013 (July 6, 1990); No Evidence Reforms Would Have Averted Market Crash, CFTC Advisory
Group Told, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 745-46 (May 13, 1988).
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Similarly, the market's reaction on January 17, 1991 to the perceived
success of the initial Allied attack on Iraq was orderly. The market had
its second best day in history, with the Dow average rising more than 114
points. Following this initial rise, the market continued to climb consist-
ently (subject to some minor pull-backs) through mid-February, with the
Dow exceeding the 2830 level by February 7, 1991. As in August 1990,
the market did not experience the wide fluctuations and volatility associ-
ated with the 1987 and 1989 market breaks. The market's orderly reac-
tion to the progress of the Gulf War and increasing prospects that the
recession in the American economy would be relatively short contrasts
sharply with the type of volatility that marks trading triggered primarily
by speculative investments in derivative instruments. One might well
conclude that the market reacts in a relatively orderly fashion to develop-
ments relating to market fundamentals. Market performance during this
period was not plagued with the volatility that many observers attribute
to a significant amount of index arbitrage.15 While the contrast between
these market declines is merely anecdotal and thus may not "prove" any-
thing, it provides an inference supporting the growing consensus that in-
vestment strategies involving derivative investments have increased
market volatility.159
Although to date regulators have taken no significant action to curb
program trading,1 ° many of the major brokerage firms have voluntarily
limited or eliminated program trading, at least for their own accounts.
61
How should regulators respond to market performance over the past sev-
158. Even during the more orderly market rise following the Allied military response to
Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, on the few occasions that observers identified a significant
amount of program trading activity, the market was more volatile. See, e.g., Robert J. Cole,
Zigzagging Dow Up 20.05 to 2,830.69, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 9, 1991, at A32 (pointing out that
heavy program trading waves contributed to volatile session).
159. By the summer of 1990, a number of regulatory controls were in effect. Circuit break-
ers had been instituted in a number of markets. Furthermore, the New York Stock Exchange
implemented its pilot program requiring that individual orders take priority over index arbi-
trage orders when the Dow Jones average moves 50 points or more during a single trading day.
In addition to the New York Stock Exchange's limits on arbitrage orders and its circuit
breaker mechanism, the decline on August 6 triggered the Chicago Mercantile Exchange's
circuit breaker for the Standard & Poor's 500 index, which is called into play by a five point
move in the futures contract for that index. It is premature to conclude that these market
controls were effective. It is worth noting, however, that on the same day that the Nikkei
Index lost more than three percent of its value, the Dow Jones' 93 point decline represented
about the same percentage drop. See Anders, supra note 151, at Cl; Marcus W. Brouchli,
Tokyo Stocks Reel From Iraq Invasion: Some Expect Repeat of Earlier Plunge, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 7, 1990, at Cl.
160. Efforts have been made, however, to limit the effect that index arbitrage can have in
contributing to market volatility. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Stock Firms Are Ending Index Arbitrage, Urging NYSE to Restrict Program
Trading, 21 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1627 (Nov. 3, 1989).
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eral years? Little doubt remains that areas of the futures and the securi-
ties markets overlap, resulting in a single market for securities and
derivative instruments. It follows that regulation of these overlapping
markets should be coordinated. Both the SEC and CFTC have pursued
policies favoring proliferation of derivative investments.162 Although
there have been some regulatory reforms, triggered primarily by the ma-
jor market disruptions discussed above, these reforms have been piece-
meal and are not part of a coordinated, well-conceived reevaluation of
current policies.
B. Current Regulatory Structure-The Jurisdictional Dispute
Both the SEC and CFTC have focused on preventing volatility over
the short term and have been increasingly vigilant in policing fraud and
manipulation. At the same time, these two agencies, as well as the secur-
ities and commodities exchanges, have been engaged in a vigorous turf
battle over who will regulate various types of derivative investments.
163
This, in turn, has resulted in continued proliferation of derivative invest-
ments. An agency interested in establishing its supremacy over deriva-
tive instruments will naturally look favorably upon exchanges'
applications for listing of additional contracts. Rather than focusing on
the jurisdictional battles, regulatory philosophy should center on a coor-
dinated approach to restoring the integrity of the markets. Unfortu-
nately, the jurisdictional dispute has thusfar eclipsed the need to get at
the root of the problem. 161
162. It is unclear whether these policies result from a coordinated effort to make the mar-
ket more efficient. It may well be that the policies of these agencies were prompted by a desire
of each to regulate derivative securities.
163. See, e.g., Ruder Seeks Expanded SEC Authority Over Equity-Related Futures Products,
20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 171 (Feb. 5, 1988). The turf battle is not merely one
between two administrative agencies; it carries over to important Senate and House commit-
tees. The CFTC and the Commodity Exchange Act generally are subject to oversight by the
agriculture committees while securities regulation and the SEC fall within the purview of the
banking committees.
164. See, eg., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT ON SECURmIEs AND Fu-
TURES MARKETS, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 84,612 (Aug. 1,
1990) (noting that the CFTC and SEC have been giving differing interpretations of the causes
of various market disruptions). While the SEC has determined that index arbitrage has con-
tributed to market volatility, the CFTC disputes this conclusion. Compare Staff Report Says
Circuit Breakers Did Not Hurt Markets In '89 Declines, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 22,
at 821 (June 1, 1990) (SEC study concluding that circuit breakers had positive effects on the
market) with Shock Absorbers Did Not Curb Volatility In Oct. 1989 Market Swings, Report
Says, 22 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 774 (May 18, 1990) (CFTC study stating that
futures exchange trading restrictions implemented after the 1987 stock market break did not
lessen volatility in October 1989) and Gramm Says SEC Crash Report Selectively Omitted Key
Data, supra note 157, at 1013-14 (challenging SEC reports that claimed that circuit breakers
adopted by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange had positive effects on the market). See, e.g.,
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The SEC initially took the position that futures contracts on securi-
ties were subject to its jurisdiction because such instruments clearly fell
within the statutory definition of "security." 165 However, the commodi-
ties exchanges, recognizing the business that could be derived from list-
ing financial futures contracts, wanted to list futures contracts on
government securities.
In 1981, representatives of the SEC and CFTC met in hopes of elim-
inating the confusion concerning the jurisdictions of the two agencies.
The resulting Johnson-Shad Accord was incorporated into the Commod-
ity Exchange Act, the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.166 Under the terms of the Accord and resulting
legislation, the SEC retained jurisdiction over options on securities while
the CFTC was granted exclusive jurisdiction over futures contracts and
options on futures contracts if the underlying commodity is either (1) a
government security that is exempt from registration under the securities
acts or (2) an index based on a group of securities.
167
The CFTC currently has jurisdiction over futures contracts on indi-
vidual government securities,168 on indices of stocks and municipal
bonds, and options on such futures contracts. The SEC has jurisdiction
over stock index options while the CFTC presides over stock index fu-
tures. Although options on foreign currencies are conceptually commod-
ities instruments, the SEC has jurisdiction over them if they are traded
on a national securities exchange; the CFTC regulates foreign currency
futures and options that are not traded on a national securities
exchange.1
69
Eben Shapiro, Circuit Breakers: Maybe They Work, Maybe They Don't, N.Y. TIMEs, July 29,
1990, § 3, at 7.
The ability of the CFTC to stand its ground in the current jurisdictional turf battle is
dependent in large part on a view that more stringent regulation and coordination of derivative
investments is not necessary.
165. "Security" is defined in § 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 and § 3(a)(10) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7Th(l), 78c(a)(10) (West Supp. 1991), to
include "any note, stock, [or] investment contract." The courts generally have given a broad
reading to the term "investment contract." See, eg., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S, Ct. 945,
955 (1990) (holding demand note to be a security); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300-
01 (1946) (holding orange grove interest and management contract to be a security); see 1
HAZEN, supra note 68, § 1.5, at 43.
166. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1988) (Commodity Exchange Act); 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988)
(Securities Act of 1933); 15 U.S.C. § 78c (1988) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934). The John-
son-Shad Accord can be found in [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T
21,332 (1981).
167. See supra note 166.
168. See, ag., Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 847 F.2d 673, 675-77 (1lth Cir. 1988) (finding
that CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over United States Treasury Bill futures contracts).
169. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-22853, 51 Fed. Reg. 5129 (1986); 1 HAZEN, supra
[Vol. 70
SHOR T-TERM/LONG-TERM DICHOTOMY
The 1981 jurisdictional accord now is being reconsidered in light of
the various market disruptions discussed above coupled with some highly
publicized charges of manipulation in many of the commodities markets.
Unfortunately, the commodities and securities industries and their re-
spective regulatory agencies seem to be more concerned with waging a
turf battle than in seeking a well-reasoned solution to any existing
problems.
As mentioned above, several proposals for regulatory reform have
been proffered. The Presidential Task Force170 recommended the institu-
tion of circuit breakers that would cause-automatic trading halts in the
face of excessive volatility.1 7 1 Under this proposal, the futures markets
would not be permitted to reopen until the underlying markets are re-
stored to relative equilibrium. This is one hopeful sign of support for
increasing regulation of short-term trading strategies-at least when such
strategies become excessively volatile. Similar recommendations ema-
nated from a study commissioned by the New York Stock Exchange.
1 72
Circuit breakers certainly help deal with the snowball effect trig-
gered by panic reaction to news or major market movement. Neverthe-
less, these types of controls merely address the symptoms without
attempting to cure the disease. If, in fact, the markets are excessively
volatile, then appropriate action should be taken to get at the root of the
problem. With the increasing evidence of a correlation between the
proliferation of derivative investment vehicles and market volatility, the
time has come to reconsider the current laissez-faire policy in granting
new listing applications. Perhaps the SEC and CFTC should consider
delisting of some of the current options and futures contracts.
Other proposals that go more directly to the root of the problems
than the imposition of circuit breakers include separating the expiration
dates for options on individual securities, stock index options, index fu-
note 68, § 1.4.1, at 19; 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 130, §§ 4.31-4.43, at 257-86; cf.
Robert B. Hiden & Donald R. Crawshaw, New Instruments, Foreign Currency Warrants and
Section 4c(f) of the Commodity Exchange Act, COMMOD. L. LETrER, Apr.-May 1988, at 11,
12 (comparing the jurisdictional boundaries of the SEC and the CFTC).
170. See BRADY REPORT, supra note 133, at 69.
171. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
172. See NYSE Panel Calls for Mandatory Trading Halts in Crisis, Single Regulator, 22
See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 896 (June 15, 1990). Rather than attack the problem of
program trading, these recommendations followed the Brady Report by zeroing in on the ad-
visability of circuit breakers. See also CME, CBT Propose To Revise Circuit Breakers For Stock
Index Futures, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1109 (July 27, 1990) (arguing that
proposed circuit breakers were in accord with the recommendations of the NYSE panel);
House Panel Approves Bill to Let SEC Restrict Computer-Driven Trading, 21 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1691-92 (Nov. 17, 1989) (describing changes that would shut down
computer trading during periods of excessive volatility).
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tures, and the like. By avoiding the perils of triple witching hour,173 the
markets are more likely to proceed in an orderly fashion.
Another potential reform measure would be to centralize federal
regulatory control of the financial markets."7 However, this would
cause a turf battle between the securities and commodities exchanges and
the SEC and CFTC. While regulatory coordination may help, it is not
the ultimate solution. What is needed is a well-balanced approach to
meeting the desires of investors to have alternative investment vehicles
while at the same time discouraging the unchecked proliferation that has
exacerbated an already volatile market environment. Another type of
coordination that has been suggested is the return to the concept of a
national market system which would replace the current fragmented en-
vironment with several exchanges and over-the-counter markets. 75 As
is the case with regulatory consolidation, market unification may in-
crease efficiency but it would not address the primary problems. Consoli-
dation and unification simply do not tackle the problem of the market's
hypersensitivity to short-term factors, nor do they address the question
whether to continue the proliferation of derivative investment
instruments.
Many current investment strategies involve options and futures that
by their nature have short-term investment goals.17 6 Participants in the
options and futures markets tend to be large investors who take large
positions. With many large block transactions in stocks reflecting vari-
ous hedging and straddle strategies, stock prices stand to be affected by
participants in the options and futures markets.
173. "Triple witching hour," which occurs four times per year, is the last hour of trading
on those days when all the options on individual stocks, index options, and index futures
expire. Substantial evidence indicates that the markets are more volatile on these days. See,
e.g., Steven P. Feinstein & William N. Goetzmann, The Effect of the "Triple Witching Hour"
on Stock Market Volatility, ECON. Rv., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 2. Other studies show that prices
are also more volatile on other expiration days. Theodore E. Day & Craig M. Lewis, The
Behavior of the Volatility Implicit in the Prices of Stock Index Options, 22 J. FIN. ECON. 103,
122 (1988); Robert A. Strong & William P. Andrew, Further Evidence of the Influence of
Option Expiration on the Underlying Common Stock, 15 J. Bus. RES. 291, 300-01 (1987).
174. See, e.g., Breeden Calls for Overhaul of U.S. Financial Regulation, 22 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 763 (May 18, 1990); see also, e.g., Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa
Vinciguerra, Financial Innovation and Uncertain Regulation: Selected Issues Regarding New
Product Development, 69 TEx. L. Rtv. 1431, 1483-95 (1991) (recommending SEC-CFTC
merger).
175. Chiappinelli, supra note 143, at 144. In the mid 1970s, there was a big push for re-
placing the current multi-exchange/over-the-counter marketplace with a single, unified na-
tional market system. Congressional action spurred SEC studies. Aside from a more efficient
over-the-counter system and more coordinated efforts in clearing agency operations, however,
not much change resulted from these efforts. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 68, § 10.13, at 584.
176. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
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Current regulatory philosophy is based on the assumption that de-
rivative investments may improve the market by providing increased op-
portunity for arbitrage and, thus, keeping share prices, both individually
and in terms of the major stock indexes, in line with their fair value. This
explanation, however, is counterintuitive when one considers the amount
of trading volume associated with index arbitrage and other forms of op-
tions and futures trading. If one accepts the downward sloping demand
model, the market is overreacting to the effects of large block transac-
tions. Such overreaction provides additional fuel to the shortening of
investors' time horizons. To the extent that the market overreacts, op-
portunities are presented whereby astute investors can take advantage of
the overreaction. This result is one of several factors in the current mar-
ket pushing towards focus on the short term.
Trading of index options and futures exacerbates the problems cre-
ated by large block transactions. Since many trading strategies involve
hedging derivative instruments against underlying stocks, "sell" and
"buy" signals trigger a large volume of transactions. 177 It follows that
index trading, like other option strategies, does affect share pricing. This
makes the market a dangerous place for longer-term investors, which in
turn may dissuade corporate managers from managing for the long term.
Coordinating the regulation of derivative instruments does not nec-
essarily require radical alteration of the current regulatory structure.
Nevertheless, in June 1990 the Bush administration introduced legisla-
tion that would have transferred jurisdiction over stock index futures
from the CFTC to the SEC. 178 What then would happen to the futures
contracts that are currently traded on commodities exchanges? One pos-
sibility would be to have CFTC regulation of traditional commodities
futures, but have SEC supervision with regard to index futures. This
could prove extremely difficult in terms of the different regulatory struc-
tures of the two agencies. Alternatively, all derivative instruments relat-
ing to stock could be required to take place on a securities exchange. If
the current system of dual regulation is deemed inappropriate, then a
better decision would be to eliminate stock index futures as commodities
and to allow the securities exchanges to trade comparable investment ve-
hicles. Such an approach doubtless would be opposed vigorously by the
commodities exchanges, which derive a substantial amount of their reve-
177. For a discussion of the effects of options and futures contract expiration on the equity
markets, see supra note 173.
178. See Treasury Submits Bill to Give SEC Jurisdiction Over Stock Index Futures, 22 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 859 (June 8, 1990); White House to Propose SEC Receive
Jurisdiction Over Stock Index Futures, 22 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 731 (May 11,
1990).
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nue from index futures. In addition, limiting the transfer of jurisdiction
to stock indexes may not be sufficient to establish the goal of uniform
regulation for similar instruments. Interest rate and currency futures
markets, as well as precious metals markets, have attributes similar to
stock indexes. It might not be feasible to transfer all of these contracts to
securities exchanges and the SEC's jurisdiction. 179
The short-term nature of options and futures contracts necessarily
draws investor attention to short-term concerns. While hedging and
other option strategies can be a helpful counterpart to an investor's long-
term investment strategy, problems arise when the market becomes ex-
cessively driven by short-term rather than long-term concerns. A contin-
ued lack of coordination in regulation of the options and futures markets
will likely lead to an unbridled increase in derivative instruments,
thereby adding further fuel to the short-term direction of the equity mar-
kets. The time has come for regulators to reconsider their laissez-faire
approach to options and futures.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF CURRENT INVESTMENT STRATEGIES ON
CORPORATE MANAGEMENT
A. Role of the Investment Markets
Managers and directors of publicly held companies in the United
States properly have identified shareholder wealth maximization as one
of their goals.' 80 Many executives, however, focus primarily on this goal,
to the neglect of longer-term considerations. Some observers feel that
this results partly from a desire on the part of institutional investors to
"dress up" their portfolios. 8 ' In today's investment climate, a number
179. One possibility for line drawing would be to adopt a functional approach in allocating
jurisdiction between the CFTC and the SEC over hybrid investment vehicles. The Futures
Trading Practices Act of 1991 as adopted by the Senate would allocate jurisdiction to the
CFTC if more than 50% of the overall value or expected change in value of the instrument is
attributable to the commodity component. See SENATE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRI-
TION AND FORESTRY, S. REP. No. 22, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 166-67 (1991). It is highly ques-
tionable whether this represents anything more than an attempt to arrive at a truce in the turf
battle between the SEC and CFTC. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the functional test as
proposed is workable.
180. Richard R. Ellsworth, Capital Markets and Competitive Decline, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 171, 171; see also, eg., Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern
Process of Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1273,
1276-77 (1991) (calling for study of the impact of new financial products on corporate goals).
181. Many mutual funds engage in "window dressing," purchasing blue chip and growth
stocks to present a more attractive quarterly or annual report. Frequently, the "window dress-
ing" will be removed once the reports are disseminated. Surveys of public pension fund man-
agers reveal that although they claim to be concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with long-
term issues, they appear to be "endlessly" looking at short-term indicators. John M. Conley &
[VCol. 70
SHOR T-TERM/LONG-TERM DICHOTOMY
of mutual funds engage in short-term trading strategies rather than fo-
cusing on the market or on particular stocks for the long haul.182 Institu-
tions that trade in options and futures tend to justify their activities as
hedging rather than short-term speculating. Nevertheless, observers
have noted that institutional money managers make their portfolio selec-
tions based on comparisons of immediate returns." 3 Accordingly, insti-
tutional investors' portfolio turnover has increased significantly since the
1960s.114 This turnover adds to market volatility by encouraging short-
term swings in reaction to these institutions' large block transactions.
Although not all observers agree,8 5 many have suggested that cor-
porate managers' obsession with short-term shareholder wealth max-
imization has, in many cases, diverted their attention away from the
efficient operation of their companies." 6 By focusing on market per-
formance over a short time horizon, corporate managers necessarily are
reacting to the trading patterns of institutional investors.
The close relationship between corporate managers and investment
bankers in this country may be further exacerbating the excessive short-
term focus of corporate managers. Some commentators have claimed
that this has harmed America's competitive position in relation to Ger-
many and Japan where there is a much stricter separation of commercial
and investment banking operations.'8 7 They suggest that the close rela-
tionship between investment bankers and the commercial community en-
courages corporate managers to be more concerned with the short-term
investment concerns than the longer-term concern for the business
enterprise.
William M. O'Barr, The Culture of Capital, HARV. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 110, 111.
In the case of five of the seven funds studied, short-term investments accounted for from five to
ten percent of their assets. Id. While this might seem like a reasonable percentage, it amounts
to billions of dollars.
182. See, e.g., James Henry, High Churnover, FORBES, Mar. 10, 1986, at 146, 146.
183. See, e.g., Will Money Managers Wreck the Economy?, Bus. WK., Aug. 13, 1984, at 86,
88.
184. See, e.g., Stephen A. Burkowitz & Dennis E. Logue, The Portfolio Turnover Explosion
Explored, 13 J. PORTFOLIO MGmT., Spring 1987, at 38, 38-39; see also Brett Trueman, A
Theory of Noise Trading in Securities Markets, 43 J. FIN. 83, 83 (1988) (suggesting that if a
portfolio manager's compensation is tied to investors' perceptions of his ability, the manager
will trade more frequently than would be justified by the information he possesses).
185. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 8, at 332-47.
186. See Ellsworth, supra note 180, at 174, 181; see also Martin Lipton & Stephen A. Ro-
senblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58
U. CHI. L. REv. 187, 189, 224-28 (1990) (suggesting that directors be elected for five-year
terms and all control-related shareholder votes occur on the same five-year cycle).
187. See Ellsworth, supra note 180, at 179. However, as pointed out below, there is evi-
dence of increasing institutional ownership in Japan. See infra notes 212-13 and accompany-
ing text.
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Other commentators believe that market forces have not interfered
with management's ability to focus on the long term.188 That companies
continue to make long-term financial commitments by investing in new
plants and equipment as well as research and development demonstrates
that they have not completely forsaken long-term concerns. Neverthe-
less, it seems abundantly clear that most corporate managers are focusing
too much on short-term considerations.
B. Managerial Compensation and Takeover Threats
While much of the foregoing discussion has highlighted the role of
the investment markets in shrinking the time horizons of corporate man-
agers, managerial compensation is another likely culprit. Compensation
packages often are structured so as to keep managers more concerned
with day-to-day operations and profitability than with long-term plan-
ning. High level corporate managers generally receive a generous annual
salary, but this forms only part of the typical compensation package.
Stock option plans, bonus plans, and other forms of profit-sharing plans
add significantly to the total compensation. A number of observers have
suggested that tying management compensation to indicia of company
performance, such as quarterly sales, earnings, or price per share, further
encourages decisionmaking with short-term horizons.'8 9 When compen-
sation is tied to stock performance, little correlation may exist between
good day-to-day, long-term management and well-compensated
management. 190
The generally accepted view has been that profit-sharing is an effec-
tive way of motivating corporate managers to maximize the value of the
company.1 91 Others have observed, however, that such a compensation
188. See, e.g., Gary Hector, Yes, You Can Manage Long Term, FORTUNE, Nov. 21, 1988,
at 64. Hector gives three anecdotal examples of companies that are making management deci-
sions by focusing on the long term: Coca Cola, Walt Disney, and Hillebrand Industries. Id. at
65-74. For example, he points to Walt Disney's expansion into foreign markets by building a
two billion dollar theme park in France that will take more than ten years to recoup its invest-
ment. Id. at 68; see also Hu, supra note 8, at 355-66 (asserting that managers should focus on
shareholder wealth maximization). Professor Hu further argues that corporate managers' time
horizons include a proper balancing of short-term and long-term factors. Id. at 360-61.
189. Jacob Noar, How to Motivate Corporate Executives to Implement Long-Range Plans,
MICH. ST. Bus. Topics, Summer 1977, at 41, 42.
190. These problems were recognized long ago in a series of cases involving the American
Tobacco Company, whose key employee compensation was tied to stock performance, a prac-
tice that was out of line with comparable businesses. See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 590-92
(1933); Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 664-92 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd without opinion, 263 A.D.
815, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1941). Quite properly, courts rarely if ever interfere with management
compensation plans.
191. See, e.g., Amin H. Amershi & Shyam Sunder, Failure of Stock Prices to Discipline
Managers in a Rational Expectations Economy, 25 J. AccT. RESEARCH 177, 178 (1987); Rick
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system is dependent upon the manager's ability to evaluate correctly in-
vestors' beliefs and to predict accurately investor reaction to the man-
ager's decisions.192
It is typically assumed that in an efficient market, stocks are valued
in large part on the discounted future value of cash flow, earnings, and
dividends.193 To the extent that this assumption is true, managers will be
encouraged to focus on short-term performance to secure their own com-
pensation. 194 Tying management compensation to stock price is an effec-
tive reward system when the stock price bears a relationship to
managers' efforts. 195 Such compensation plans, however, encourage
long-term planning only if the stock price accurately reflects the dis-
counted value of cash flow, earnings, and dividends well into the future.
If the stock price unduly emphasizes near-term returns, then such a com-
pensation scheme would discourage a manager from instituting policies
that entail capital expenditures geared to a longer view of future returns.
Because of these shortcomings, tying management compensation to stock
performance is not the optimal way in which to encourage management
to engage in value-maximizing strategies.
Some studies have indicated that the value of successful bidder firms
in corporate acquisitions correlates positively with the extent to which
the bidder firm's shares are owned by its managers. 96 This correlation
may indicate a belief that the greater the stake managers have in their
own companies, the more their interests match those of the shareholders.
It follows that when corporate managers' compensation is tied to their
company's stock performance, many managers may evaluate acquisitions
more in terms of the short-term effects on their investment than on the
long-term consequences for the constituent companies.
There is considerable evidence that stock prices do not accurately
discount the future. 197 One explanation is that not all investors act ho-
mogeneously in valuing shares. Economists describe irrational or "aber-
Antle & Abbie Smith, An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of
Corporate Executives, 24 J. AccT. RESEARCH 1, 81 n.2 (1986) (collecting authorities).
192. See Amershi & Sunder, supra note 191, at 178-79.
193. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
194. This conclusion assumes that market prices place undue weight on near-term returns.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 189-90.
196. Wilbur Lewellen et al., Merger Decisions and Executive Stock Ownership in Acquiring
Firms, 7 J. AcCT. & ECON. 209, 229 (1985); Victor You et al., Mergers and Bidders' Wealth:
Managerial and Strategic Factors, in THE ECONOMICS OF STRATEGIC PLANNING 201, 217
(Lacy G. Thomas, III ed., 1986).
197. Commentators have suggested that the stock markets overreact to short-term infor-
mation and fail to take into account the longer-term view. See Joerding, supra note 27, at 72-
81.
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rant" investor behavior as market "noise" that interferes with
efficiency. 9 To the extent that corporate managers focus on the funda-
mental factors that are traditionally accepted as affecting stock prices,
they are ignoring the "noise" and therefore may not be making decisions
consistent with the market's perception of what is needed for the com-
pany to maximize value.1 99
Many observers contend that the threat of takeover keeps manage-
ment focusing on value-maximizing strategies and that management's
failure to maximize value will result in a bidder for control offering a
substantial premium. However, the costs of proxy fights, tender offers,
or other control mechanisms for ousting management are high.2"'
Therefore, they do not provide an efficient mechanism for bringing man-
agement policies into line with value maximization.2"' Moreover, there
seems to be a growing belief that corporate takeovers are not value-creat-
ing, but instead merely transfer existing value to the shareholders of the
target company.2 "2 If true, then managers' attempts to replicate the ef-
fects of a takeover through a management buyout 03 would be equally
ineffective in maximizing value.
Corporate takeovers may encourage value maximizing decisions in
other ways. For example, if management can prevent its company's
stock from being undervalued, potential acquirors will not be willing to
pay a large takeover premium. Thus, the ever-present threat of takeover
may encourage corporate managers to make decisions that they believe
will make the stock attractive to investors and thereby create a buying
demand that will support the stock price. Evidence persists, however,
that managers do not accurately perceive the factors that will enhance
198. Economists accept that markets are "noisy," but adherents to the Efficient Capital
Market Hypothesis argue that the effect of noise is factored into the market price. See supra
text accompanying notes 89-93.
199. See Amershi & Sunder, supra note 191, at 185-93.
200. Id. at 190.
201. Id. at 190-91 (relying on JAN MossiN, THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF FINANCIAL
MARKETS 143 (1977) and F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECO-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 37-38 (2d ed. 1980)).
202. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
203. See, eg., Thomas L. Hazen, Management Buyouts and Corporate Governance Para-
digms, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 1 (1990). For the SEC's Chief Economist's analysis of
management buyouts, see Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulsen, Free Cash Flow and Stockholder
Gains in Going Private Transactions, 44 J. FIN. 771, 773 (1989).
Despite the criticisms of management buyouts (MBOs), it has been suggested that they
may be the only viable response to a hostile bid that would prevent breaking up the company.
Coffee, supra note 5, at 10. However, many leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and MBOs also will
eventually result in some break-up because of the necessity of raising funds to pay off the debt
obligations incurred as a result of the buyout.
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value.2" Thus, the takeover threat, as well as the current practice of
tying management compensation to the stock price, may be ineffective in
encouraging managerial decisionmaking that maximizes the firm's
value.20 In fact, when management compensation or the fear of take-
over drives decision making, long-term planning may be neglected.
C. The Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance
Institutional investors today dominate shareholder rolls throughout
the nation's largest corporations.20 6 Earlier, this Article considered the
effect of increased institutional trading upon market volatility.207 Institu-
tional investors also have a significant and growing impact on corporate
governance, 208 which prompts an examination as to whether institutional
investors are contributing to the excessive short-term focus by corporate
management.
Until recently, institutional investors tended to side with incumbent
corporate management. It was commonly assumed that institutional in-
vestors, with their generally conservative investment goals, did not want
to be involved with companies in the throes of turmoil. The best way to
avoid turmoil was to side with management. If management was not
performing satisfactorily, institutional investors typically responded by
selling their shares.
In the past several years, however, institutional investors have be-
come far more active in corporate affairs.2 'o Not only have institutional
204. See Amershi & Sunder, supra note 191, at 178-79.
205. Id.
206. See Jayne W. Barnard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance, 69
N.C. L. REV. 1135, 1175-87 (1991) (listing the ten largest equityholders in the 50 largest For-
tune 500 companies).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 181-86.
208. Some have expressed concern about the effects of so much power being concentrated
in the hands of a few. See, eg., PETER F. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION-How
PENSION FUND SOCIALISM CAME TO AMERICA 1-46 (1976).
209. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, ABA SECTION ON
BUSINESS LAW, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND PRoxY REFORM (Aug. 7,
1990) (report presented at ABA Annual Meeting, Chicago, Ill.); Dennis J. Block & Jonathan
M. Hoff, Emerging Role Of The Institutional Investor, N.Y. L.J., April 12, 1990, at 5; Christo-
pher Power & Vicky Cahan, Shareholders Aren't Just Rolling Over Anymore, Bus. WK., April
27, 1987, at 32; Hillary Rosenberg, The Revolt of the Institutional Shareholders, INSTITU-
TIONAL INVESTOR, May 1987, at 131; Richard W. Stevenson, Large Foot in Board-Room
Door. Giant Pension Fund Leads Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1991, at Dl; see also
Clarke E. Chastain, Bridling Corporate-Takeover Warfare, ADV. MGMT. J., Autumn 1985, at
4, 7-8 (noting increased concentration of capital in institutional investments); Peter F.
Drucker, Taming the Corporate Takeover, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 30, 1984, at A30 (same); Allan
Sloan, Why is No One Safe?, FORBES, March 11, 1985, at 134 (discussing the increase in corpo-
rate takeovers); Will Money Managers Wreck the Economy?, Bus. WK., Aug. 13, 1984, at 86
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investors become active voters, they also have taken the initiative
through shareholder proposals designed to bring corporate managers
more in line with the goals of institutional money managers. In sharp
contrast to their earlier support for management, institutional sharehold-
ers in recent years have opposed management entrenchment devices such
as the poison pill. Such opposition to anti-takeover devices is designed to
retain an active market for corporate control which, as discussed earlier,
leads to increased emphasis on short-term maximization of shareholder
wealth. Thus, the growth of institutional investing may be yet another
factor in influencing management to focus on near-term performance.
D. Empirical Evidence on the Length of Managers' View
Measuring empirically the time horizon managers of American cor-
porations use in planning is obviously difficult. Although several studies
relating to these issues have been undertaken, the results, perhaps not
surprisingly, are in conflict.
In 1985 the Office of the Chief Economist of the SEC published a
study addressing the issue of whether the threat posed by hostile tender
offers "preoccupies corporate executives with propping up short-term
earnings, at the expense of investing in long-term projects, such as re-
search and development."210 The Chief Economist found that market
forces are not the cause of chronic short-termism on the part of Ameri-
can corporate managers. The study notes that many critics of the sup-
posedly short-term focus of corporate managers point to the long-term
View taken by Japanese companies.2 ' In reality, the study found, there
has been a dramatic increase in institutional ownership of shares of Japa-
nese companies during the past forty years.212 Rather than encouraging
Japanese managers to focus on short-term goals, however, increasing in-
stitutional ownership of Japanese companies apparently has induced that
country's managers to focus on the long term. 213 Thus, concludes the
(stating that increased concentration of capital in institutional investors has led to a more
short-term view).
210. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP, TENDER OF-
FERS, AND LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS 1 (1985) [hereinafter CHIEF ECONOMIST STUDY]. I do
not refer to this as the SEC's study because the study begins with the following disclaimer:
"The views expressed herein are those of the Chief Economist only. The Commission has
expressed no view on this study." Coverpage to id.
211. Id. at 2 n.2.
212. Id. The study relied on another Japanese research project which points out that from
1950 to 1982, institutional ownership of Japanese companies rose from 38.6% to 71.9%. JAP-
ANESE SECURITIES RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SECURITIES MARKETS IN JAPAN 1984 (1983).
213. CHIEF ECONOMIST STUDY, supra note 210, at 2 n.2 (quoting C. CARL PAGELS, JAPAN
VS. THE WEST 13 (1984)). Mr. Pagels observes:
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study, market forces such as institutional ownership are not a factor in
the differing time horizons of Japanese and American managers.
The Chief Economist's study is not based on hard data but, never-;
theless, notes that "there is an abundance of indirect evidence that is
inconsistent with the short-term argument. 2 1 4 For example, the study
points to evidence that stock prices reflect time-discounted cash flows
rather than reported earnings. Cash flow certainly has become increas-
ingly important in share pricing as it relates to the market for corporate
control. The market for corporate control that flourished in the 1980s
was based in large part on leveraged financing. As such, a company's
cash flow became important as a measure of the amount of debt that
could be serviced. In the Delaware case Smith v. Van GorkoM215 man-
agement's valuation of the company in a buyout context was based on
the amount of debt that could be serviced in connection with the acquisi-
tion.21 6 The fact that cash flow may be an important factor in share
pricing, however, does not undermine the argument that in making deci-
sions affecting earnings and cash flow, corporate managers have been
concerned with the threat of takeovers and, thus, have focused primarily
on the short-term. The Chief Economist's study is not terribly convinc-
ing in refuting this argument.217
Robert Buzzell and Mark Chussil conducted a study similar to the
Chief Economist's.2 18 This study evaluated the performance of 178 com-
panies based on their discounted cash flow and market value. The au-
thors concluded that most of the companies achieved results significantly
"In Japan, where virtually all equity is held by banks and large investment firms, the
concern for short-term performance is not nearly as acute [as] for longer-term pros-
pects. As a result, Japanese firms are not as concerned as Western firms about short-
term profits or, for that matter, profits in general."
Id. (quoting PAGELS, supra, at 13).
214. Id. at 3.
215. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
216. Id. at 865. This was not based solely on cash flow since the target company had
investment tax credits which functioned as the equivalent of cash to an appropriate acquiror.
Ironically, the court held that the valuation was not protected by the business judgment rule
because, among other things, the directors acted precipitously within a two-hour meeting and
did not shop the company around. Id. at 871, 893.
217. The study also points to the fact that price-to-earnings ratios vary widely as further
evidence that corporate managers are not preoccupied with beefing up earnings in the short-
term. However, the mere fact that the market may take other factors into account does not
detract from the claim that earnings can be significant. CHIEF ]ECONOMIST STUDY, supra note
210, at 3.
218. Robert D. Buzzell & Mark J. Chussil, Managing for Tomorrow, SLOAN MGMT. REv.,
Summer 1985, at 3, 10.
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below their potential.219 The authors surmise, in contrast to the Chief
Economist's study, that corporate managers in fact are concentrating too
much on short-term earnings and are unwilling to make the up-front cap-
ital investments necessary to help achieve the long-term growth
potential.22 °
The Chief Economist's study also examined the relationship of insti-
tutional ownership to research and development expenses and concludes
that institutional ownership does not lead to a decrease in such expendi-
tures.2 2 1 The absence of a correlation between institutional ownership
and research and development expenditures does not refute the short-
term argument, however. First, many of the glamor stocks during the
1980s were high-technology companies that thrive on research and devel-
opment. Thus, not surprisingly, the study found that the capital market
positively valued companies embarking on research and development
projects.2 2 2 Furthermore, recent anecdotal evidence conflicts with the
study's conclusions: one outgrowth of the leveraged buyout of R.J.
Reynolds Industries, Inc. was the suspension of expenditures on develop-
ment of a smokeless cigarette. 23 Furthermore, at least one recent study
did find an inverse relationship between institutional holdings of com-
puter stocks and an increase in research and development expendi-
tures.224 On the other hand, a 1989 study found a direct correlation
between research and development expenditures and institutional owner-
ship for large firms involved in research-intensive industries. 25
Because the available studies on research and development expendi-
tures reached such contradictory conclusions, they do not shed much
light on the extent to which corporate managers are paying attention to
long-term concerns. Moreover, since these studies focus on research in-
tensive industries, they may well be more dedicated to research and de-
velopment than American industry taken as a whole.
Even after devoting careful attention to the studies of managerial
219. Less than one third of the companies studied achieved more than 60% of their poten-
tial. Id. at 8-10.
220. Id. at 10-11.
221. CHIEF ECONOMIST STUDY, supra note 210, at 4-8; see Buzzell & Chussil, supra note
218, at 10-11.
222. CHIEF ECONOMIST STUDY, supra note 210, at 6-7; see Buzzell & Chussil, supra note
218, at 12-13.
223. Safer Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 1989, at A38.
224. Samuel B. Graves, Institutional Ownership and Corporate R & D in the Computer
Industry, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 417, 424 (1988).
225. Charles Hill & Gary S. Hanson, Institutional Holdings and Corporate R & D Intensity
in Research Intensive Industries, ACADEMY OF MGMT. BEST PAPERS PROCEEDINGS, 49TH
ANNUAL MEETING 17, 20 (1989) (best paper).
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time horizons, one is likely to feel no closer to an ultimate answer to the
question whether American management has an undue short-term bias
in its business outlook. Factors such as cash flow and research and de-
velopment spending are subject to so many varying influences that one
can always conjure up an alternate explanation for a seemingly correla-
tive relationship. Moreover, deciding if managers focus "too much" on
near-term performance requires a conclusion that is ultimately subjec-
tive. Nonetheless, an examination of executive behavior in a particular
context-a threatened or actual takeover-may shed some futher light
on the issue of managerial time horizon.
V. CONTROL-RELATED TRANSACTIONS AND THE SHORT-TERM!
LONG-TERM DEBATE
A. Taking Advantage of Discounts-The Market for Control
Over the past several years, observers of American business have
witnessed a dynamic market for corporate control. The proliferation in
the 1980s of hostile takeovers raised a number of questions, not the least
of which is the extent to which target company managers should be per-
mitted to use defensive tactics.22 6 The trend in recent case law has been
to focus corporate managers' concerns, not in terms of the best interests
of the company in terms of the long-term maximization of shareholder
profits, but rather in terms of short-term maximization of shareholder
wealth.2 27 Having management focus on short-term shareholder wealth
226. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1164 (1981) (advocat-
ing that target company management be prohibited from resisting hostile offers) with Lucian
A. Bebchuck, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1028,
1030 (1982) (arguing that target managers should be allowed to seek competing bids); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender
Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1145, 1294 (1981) (same); Ronald
Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 51, 66 (1982) (same) and Dale Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Tar-
get Shareholders in Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 53, 94-
95 (1985) (advocating that target management should be permitted to use a variety of defensive
tactics). See generally Jennifer J. Johnson & Mary Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the
Role of Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 315, 320 (1987) (proposing a rule to clarify and
limit directors' power to enter into exclusive merger agreements).
227. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986). Short-term maximization of shareholder wealth also has been said to be the only
issue when dealing with management buyouts. See, e.g., Dale Oesterle & Jon Norberg, Man-
agement Buyouts: Creating or Appropriating Shareholder Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REv. 207, 251
(1988); Hazen, supra note 203, at 2.
Few would doubt that encouraging multi-bidder takeovers helps maximize shareholder
wealth. A recent study found that premiums in multi-bidder offers range from 42-46%, while
premiums in single bidder offers range from 26-30%. Michael Bradley et al., Synergistic Gains
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maximization is contrary to what many would describe as the sounder
policy of focusing on long-term goals.
228
The market for corporate control as embodied in the proliferation of
corporate takeovers, management buyouts, and corporate restructuring
has brought a great deal of publicity to the wide disparity between mar-
ket price and asset value. This disparity results in a discounted public
market for securities. A number of explanations have been offered for
the disparity between market price and asset value. Some observers
claim that the discount reflects the market's assessment of the perform-
ance of current management. 229 At first blush this explanation seems
appealing. It is almost intuitive that an effectively managed company
should have a going concern value that is greater than its asset value
since it is up to management to use the company's assets efficiently.
While management inefficiency might explain some takeovers, however,
it clearly does not explain all of the takeover activity that occurred in the
1980s. 230 Many well-managed companies succumbed to high-premium,
control-related transactions. 231 Furthermore, many takeovers are man-
agemeni-led; if the explanation for the discrepancy between a company's
market value and its take-out value is that it is being run by inefficient
management, then a management-led buyout reflects management's con-
cession that it has been managing the company inefficiently.232
from Corporate Acquisitions and Their Division Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquir-
ing Firms, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 21-25 (1988).
228. See, e.g., Robert J. Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board: Behavioral Science and
Corporate Law, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1981) ("There is growing recognition by the corporate
establishment in America that its priorities should be reordered to achieve profit maximization
in the long-term rather than in the short-term."). One commentator has suggested that equat-
ing shareholder wealth maximization with the proper outcome is based on a "crude sort of
utilitarianism." Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Social Responsibility: What It Might Mean,
If It Were Really to Matter, 71 IowA L. REV. 557, 570 (1986).
229. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuck, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A
Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23, 28 (1982); Manne, supra note 12, at 112-13.
230. The suggestion that discounts reflect the market's assessment of management has been
disputed in many quarters. See Kraakman, supra note 9, at 904.
231. See, eg., SEC ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON TENDER OFFERS, REPORT OF RECOMMEN-
DATIONS 34 (1983) ("[W]hile in certain cases takeovers have served as a discipline on ineffi-
cient management, in other cases there is little to suggest that inefficiency of target company
management is a factor .... ").
232. There might be some truth in this claim. Managers might argue that their desire to
take the company private is motivated by their desire to maximize shareholder wealth in the
face of a market that is undervaluing the firm's shares. Managers' willingness to pay for the
company presumably also is motivated by a belief that they and their financial backers will
profit from the transaction. Thus, those backing a management buyout must believe that they
will receive a favorable return on their investment. Considering the costs of a leveraged trans-
action, it probably is anticipated that the expected return will exceed any profits from alterna-
tive investments. The question then becomes whether managers should offer existing
shareholders the choice of participating in the future returns on this basis.
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Apart from the inefficient management rationale, another explana-
tion for the discrepancy between market value and take-out value is that
trading in the public market reflects a discount for minority shares and it
is only in a control-related transaction that the premium emerges.233 Be-
cause minority shares do not have the power to transfer control of the
company, the market gives them a control premium only when the com-
pany has been put in play by controlling shareholders or management
who are willing to put the company up for sale. Someone desiring to
take control of the company can, by offering the premium to minority
shares, make it attractive for them to sell. When sold, these shares that
were formerly widely dispersed become concentrated in the hands of the
bidder, who may be able to take control or at least get representation on
the board of directors by voting the shares together.
The ability to enter into control-related transactions has increased as
a result of the availability of huge amounts of debt financing from finan-
cial institutions or from high-yield high-risk debt financing, more popu-
larly known as "junk bonds." The availability of debt financing increases
the number of potential buyers, thus narrowing the gap between a firm's
market value and its takeover value.234 With the decline of the high-
yield "junk bond" bond market, however, many companies formerly
identified as potential takeover targets have lost some of their value.
Over the past year, hostile take-over activity has decreased while the
number of friendly business combinations correspondingly has risen. In
the absence of debt financing, hostile takeovers must be conducted
through proxy machinery, thereby coercing management to go along on
a friendly basis.2 35 Thus, although the mechanics have changed and the
level of activity has declined, corporate combinations and restructuring
remain a factor in valuing companies' shares.236
233. For discussion of control premium theories, see Thomas L. Hazen, Transfers of Cor-
porate Control and Duties of Controlling Shareholders-Common Law, Tender Offers, Invest-
ment Companies--and a Proposal for Reform, 125 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1023, 1024-27 (1977).
234. The nearly two-hundred point decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on Octo-
ber 13, 1989 may have been due in large part to the decreasing liquidity of junk bonds. Ac-
cordingly, many stocks, their price reflecting the potential for a takeover premium, lost a
portion of that premium.
235. This, for example, has been the case with AT&T's recent acquisition of NCR Corp.
See A. T. & T. Dealfor NCR Final, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 20, 1991, at D4.
236. Louis Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legisla-
tion, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 272 (1983); see, ag., Coffee, supra note 5, at 8 (arguing that "the
existence of substantial discounts between asset and stock valuations implies a failure in ex-
isting managerial compensation packages"); Kraakman, supra note 9, at 892. But see Michael
C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence,
11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 20-21 (1983) (arguing that stock prices during corporate combinations
inaccurately estimate future value). Jensen and Ruback write:
Several studies show indications of systematic reductions in stock prices of bidding
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As another possible explanation for the disparity between a com-
pany's market value and asset value, some observers claim that the cor-
poration cannot be explained in terms of simple concepts of ownership,
since a corporation consists of a nexus of contractual relationships and
that this, in turn, partially explains the market's pricing of securities.237
Proponents of this theory postulate that the discount reflects the fact that
corporate managers and shareholders have differing risk preferences.238
To the extent that investors are more risk averse than corporate manag-
ers, their risk aversion will result in a more conservative investment and,
thus, may depress the value of the stock. Assuming that corporate man-
agers, as owners of the business, are less risk averse, they will be willing
to pay more for the company in light of the potentially higher returns
that may ensue from their greater risk-taking.
Professor Coffee has suggested that the discount also is explicable as
a failure in the managerial compensation system.239 While corporate
managers generally seek deferred job security, shareholders ordinarily
bear such business risks as insolvency. Some observers claim that the
hostile takeover movement can be seen as a way of shifting this risk to
management. 4° Management buyouts can similarly be viewed as a re-
sult of the conflicting risk-taking strategies of corporate managements
and shareholders.
B. Post Acquisition Evidence
If acquisitions are, in fact, value-enhancing transactions, then it can
fairly be said that they are consistent with long-term interests. On the
other hand, if acquisitions are proven unsuccessful, this would show that
bidders are paying too much and that the ultimate price paid for realiz-
ing the short-term goal of shareholder-wealth maximization will be de-
creased productivity or efficiency in the long term.
firms in the year following the event. These post-outcome negative abnormal returns
are unsettling because they are inconsistent with market efficiency and suggest that
changes in stock price during takeovers overestimate the future efficiency gains from
mergers.
Id.
237. See, eg., Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership:
Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155, 1176 (1985) (asserting that the "structure of
corporate ownership varies systematically in ways that are consistent with value
maximization").
238. Coffee, supra note 5, at 9.
239. Id. at 8-9.
240. "Mhe hostile takeover can be seen not simply as a mechanism that compels a man-
agement to accept that level of business risk that shareholders deem appropriate, but as a
means by which shareholders outflank the safeguards managers obtained to protect the
promises of deferred compensation and job security." Id. at 24.
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A number of studies have analyzed the effect of mergers and other
business combinations on the value of the target company. Studies in the
1970s and 1980s assessed post-takeover returns241 and revealed that take-
overs increased the value of target company stock. 42 Such studies have
led some commentators to conclude that "[flinancial markets reward
well-managed firms."'243 Many proponents of the law and economics
movement share this view.2" Many target companies, however, were
well-managed prior to being taken over. This fact has persuaded some
observers that management ineffectiveness does not explain many of the
takeovers of the 1980s.245
One important article concludes that, although the shareholders of
target companies generally fare well as a result of a takeover, the share-
holders of bidder firms do not do as well.246 The target company stock
rises in anticipation of the increased efficiency resulting from the merger
and, thus, the bidder may not participate fully in the gains from these
241. See, e.g., Jensen & Ruback, supra note 236, at 22; Richard C. Roll, The Hubris Hy-
pothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197, 213 (1986).
242. When evaluating the studies dealing with post-merger value, it is important to remem-
ber that they focus on share value-that is, shareholder wealth maximization. These studies
are valid indicia of a firm's long-term health only when present value represents discounted
future value rather than other factors, such as discounted cash flow.
243. Larry H.P. Lang et al., Managerial Performance, Tobin's Q and the Gains from Suc-
cessful Tender Offers, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 137, 139 (1989). These authors reach their conclusion
by analyzing target companies in successful takeovers in comparison with the ratio of the
firm's market value to its replacement value (Tobin's Q). Id. at 140-41. It was assumed that
high Q firms represent well-managed companies, while a low Q is indicative of a poorly man-
aged firm. Id. at 145. It also is suggested that low Q firms typically suffer from management
entrenchment. Randall Morck et al., Do Management Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?, 45 J.
FIN. ECON. 31, 34 (1990).
244. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53
VA. L. REV. 259, 265-66 (1967).
245. See, e.g., SEC ADVISORY COMMrrTEE ON TENDER OFFERS, supra note 231, at 34; see
also Hazen, Persona, supra note 6, at 274 ("[B]ecause the leveraged financing boom made
takeovers much easier, corporate raiders shifted their focus from poorly managed companies
to companies with a sufficient cash flow to support the large financing costs.").
One alternative explanation for the takeover activity of the 1980's is that the ways in
which corporate shares are valued have changed. See James LeBaron & Christopher J.
Speidell, Why are the Parts Worth More than the Sum? "Chop Shop," A Corporate Valuation
Model, in THE MERGER BOoM 78, 80 (Lynn E. Browne & Eric S. Rosengran eds., 1987)
(concluding that replacement cost of corporate assets is playing an increased role in the valua-
tion process). Some commentators have pointed to external events as explaining the increase
in takeovers during the 1980s. See, e.g., David J. Ravenscraft, The 1980s Merger Wave: An
Industrial Organization Perspective, in THE MERGER BOOM, supra, at 17, 31-37 (pointing to
deregulation and relaxation of the antitrust laws).
246. Jensen & Ruback, supra note 236, at 20-22. As pointed out by another article, the
bidding firm's shareholders often see their share values diminish. Michael Lubatkin, Value-
Creating Mergers: Fact or Folklore?, 2 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 295, 295 (1988).
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efficiencies.24 7 This conclusion is based on the fact that as the pre-acqui-
sition price rises, so must the takeover premium, thus causing the bidder
to pay more for the target company. Observers increasingly accept the
view that returns to shareholders of bidders are not terribly
impressive.24
Acquisitions that increase managerial benefits at the expense of re-
ducing the shareholder wealth of a bidder would not be permitted if
shareholders closely monitored managers' investment decisions.249 A
philosophy of pursuing growth through acquisitions, therefore, may be
evidence of a strategy that seeks to assure the survival of the corporation
as an independent entity over the long term.250 Acquisitions, although
reducing short-term bidder wealth, may nevertheless help entrench bid-
der management. When poor performance threatens management job se-
curity, managers may decide to have the firm enter a new business,
hoping that they might be able to manage more successfully. In fact,
these acquisitions also may be part of a longer-term strategy that not
only benefits management, but benefits the acquiring firm as a whole.
Some authorities maintain that post-merger performance has been
disappointing,251 while others claim that bidder firms benefit signifi-
cantly.25 2 Most of the studies dealing with post-acquisition performance
have been based on relatively short-term data.253 Evidence in longer-
term studies suggests that post-acquisition firms are not able to maintain
247. See Michael C. Jensen, The Free Cash Flow Theory of Takeovers: A Financial Perspec-
tive on Mergers and Acquisitions and the Economy, in THE MERGER BoOM, supra note 245, at
102.
248. Michael Bradley et al., Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and Their Divi-
sion Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 31 (1988);
Roll, supra note 241, at 209-10.
249. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process,
2 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 7, 8-10 (1988).
250. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE, AND GROWTH 45-52 (rev. ed.
1967); GORDON DONALDSON, MANAGING CORPORATE WEALTH: THE OPERATION OF A
COMPREHENSIVE FINANCIAL GOALS SYSTEM 37, 175 (1984); GORDON DONALDSON & JAY
W. LORSCH, DECISION MAKING AT THE Top: THE SHAPING OF STRATEGIC DECISION 160
(1983).
251. See, e.g., Richard E. Caves, Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions on the Economy: An
Industrial Organization Perspective, in THE MERGER BooM, supra note 245, at 149.
252. Lubatkin, supra note 246, 298-99; see, eg., Steven Kaplan, The Effects of Management
Buyouts on Operating Performance and Value, 24 J. FIN. EON. 217, 251 (1989); Frank R.
Lichtenberg, Productivity Improvements from Changes in Ownership, MERGERS & ACQUISI-
TIONS, Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 48, 48; Frank R. Lichtenberg & Donald Siegel, Productivity and
Changes in Ownership of Manufacturing Plants: Comments and Discussion, in BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 643, 675 (1987).
253. See Karen Fowler & Dennis R. Schmidt, Tender Offers, Acquisitions, and Subsequent
Performance in Manufacturing Firms, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 962, 963 (1988).
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pre-acquisition levels of profitability."' 4 These studies also conclude that
a longer-term view of shareholder returns seriously questions those
shorter-term studies that find value enhancement resulting from corpo-
rate acquisitions.2 5
The anecdotal evidence is equally inconclusive. Consider, for exam-
ple, the Business Week cover story that listed its choices for the ten best
and ten worst acquisitions of the decade. 56 Drawing any conclusions
from the twenty deals ranked in this list is difficult.257 Some industries
appeared on both lists, 5 ' which probably indicates that some combina-
tions are value-enhancing while others are not. One of the combinations
involved a target company that had previously been purchased and then
spun off when the first acquisition was deemed unsuitable.25 9
While generalizations can be made from the Business Week list, it is
important to realize that many transactions can be found that do not fall
in line with these conclusions. Furthermore, these generalizations simply
may be tautological with the benefit of hindsight.2" One lesson of the
254. Id. at 971.
255. Id. For other commentators questioning the long-term success of corporate acquisi-
tions, see Gershon Mandelker, Risk and Return: The Case of Merging Firms, 1 J. FIN. ECON.
303, 304 (1974).
On the other hand, some evidence suggests that productivity increases following an acqui-
sition. Lichtenberg, supra note 252, at 48 (analyzing results in 19,000 plants).
256. See Michael Oneal et al., The Best and the Worst Deals of the '80s: What We Learned
From All Those Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers, Bus. WK., Jan. 15, 1990, at 52, 53.
257. The Business Week cover story identified the following as the best deals of the decade:
Dow Chemical/Merrill, Textize (1981, 1985; $517 million value); General Electric/RCA
(1986; $6.1 billion); Grand Metropolitan/Heublein (1987; $1.1 billion); May Department
Stores/Associated Dry Goods (1986; $2.4 billion); News Corp./Metromedia (1986; $2 billion);
Quaker Oats/Stokely-Van Camp (1984; $220 million); Triangle Industries/National Can,
American Can (1985, 1986; $1 billion); UAL/Pan American pacific routes (1986; $750 mil-
lion); Unilever/Chesebrough-Ponds (1987; $3.1 billion); Wells Fargo/Crocker National (1986;
$1.1 billion). The story identified the following as the worst deals of the eighties: Baldwin
United/MGIC (1982; $1.2 billion); Beatrice Foods/Esmark (1984; $2.7 billion); Blue Arrow/
Manpower (1987; $1.3 billion); Campeau/Allied Stores, Federated Department Stores (1986,
1988; $10.1 billion); Fluor/St. Joe Minerals (1981; $2.3 billion); Honeywell/Sperry Aerospace
(1986; $1 billion); LTV/Republic Steel (1984; $714 million); Pan American/National Airlines
(1980; $374 million); Republican Bank/Interfirst (1987; $387 million); Sohio/Kennecott
(1981; $1.8 billion). Id.
258. These twice-listed industries included airlines, food, retail stores, banks, and manufac-
turing. Id.
259. Perhaps ironically, Grand Metropolitan's acquisition of Heublein followed RJR's ac-
quisition of Heublein and its subsequent disposition by RJR/Nabisco. Assuming the Business
Week value estimates are correct, the history of the Heublein deals tends to show that if the
proper strategy is used, takeovers can be value-enhancing. 1d. at 57.
260. The article identifies the following elements of the value-enhancing combinations that
were absent in the others: "Have a strategic purpose, Know the business, Investigate thor-
oughly, Make realistic assumptions, Don't pay too much, Don't borrow too much, Integrate
carefully and fast." Id. at 54.
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twenty deals Business Week considered is that acquirors typically fare
better when they acquire a business with which they are already famil-
iar.261 This conclusion has garnered academic support262 and is certainly
consistent with the now widely accepted wisdom that the conglomerate
craze of the 1960s and 1970s was ill-conceived. Diminution in share-
holder wealth as a result of diversifying acquisitions may be viewed as a
cost to the shareholders of reducing managers' job loss risk.26 3 Aca-
demic support also exists for the implication that better managers make
better acquirors.2 4
Many of the combinations identified as "the worst" in the Business
Week survey were highly leveraged and failed because of their inability to
service the debt charge. On the other hand, many analysts argue that
leveraging forces firms to rid themselves of unwanted assets and, there-
fore, become "lean and mean. '' 265 Other commentators have identified
bidder misinformation2 66 and bidder overpayment resulting from bidder
management hubris as explanations for unsuccessful acquisitions. 26 7 It
further has been suggested that one result of bidder overpayment or poor
post-acquisition performance is to make the firm more attractive as a
target for firms that do not have a history of making bad acquisitions.268
The Business Week article is not alone in questioning the success of the
takeover movement. Others have likewise suggested that "the track rec-
ord of corporate strategies has been dismal .... Only the lawyers, invest-
ment bankers, and original sellers have prospered in most of these
acquisitions, not the shareholders.
'2 69
These observations are further evidence that concern for short-term
maximization of shareholder wealth has led to transactions that are un-
productive in the long run. The willingness to generate high control pre-
miums has resulted in the sacrifice of long-term growth and success. It
261. Id.
262. See, eg., Morck et al., supra note 243, at 42-43 (reporting findings based on a sample
of 326 acquisitions from 1975 through 1987).
263. Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglom-
erate Mergers, 12 BFLL J. ECON. 605, 606 (1981).
264. Lang et al., supra note 243, at 139; Morek et al., supra note 243, at 45.
265. See, eg., Morck et al., supra note 243, at 47.
266. See id. at 39 (citing Paul Asquith et al., Merger Returns and the Form of Financing,
(Harvard Business School Working Paper, 1987)).
267. Roll, supra note 241, at 212-14.
268. Mark L. Mitchell & Kenneth Lehn, Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets?, 98 J.
POL. ECON. 372, 396 (1990).
269. Michael Porter, From Competitive Advantage to Corporate Strategy, HARV. Bus.
REv., May-June 1987, at 43, 43-46.
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thus appears that the acquisition movement of the past two decades gen-
erally has not been a satisfactory substitute for long-term planning.
C. The Market for Corporate Control and Managers' Obligations
The structure of corporate America has changed rapidly during the
past fifteen years. Hostile acquisitions, friendly takeovers, corporate
restructurings, and management buyouts have contributed to the consid-
erable realignment of American private industry. These realignments of
corporate ownership necessarily affect various constituencies, including
shareholders, employees, consumers, and creditors. 270 Frequently, man-
agement must react to unexpected hostile takeovers-real or threatened.
Corporate managers may believe that a hostile takeover attempt would
sacrifice the long-term future of the company in favor of short-term
profit maximization. Rather than permit a hostile bidder to buy the
company and then split it up in order to finance the acquisition, manage-
ment might well prefer to preserve the corporate culture and keep the
company independent. Permitting managers to defend against takeovers
allows them to preserve the status quo in hopes that the company can
continue to pursue its long-term objectives. It also permits managers to
keep their own jobs.
The courts and commentators have realized that, in defending
against a hostile takeover, the interest of target company managers in
preserving their own jobs may conflict with the best interests of the com-
pany. This realization has led many courts to invalidate defensive tactics
unless they have an independent business purpose, such as defending the
corporation from a perceived threat, and therefore can be upheld under a
variation of the business judgment rule.2 7 1 The difficulty with a rule that
permits management to defend against hostile bidders is that it may al-
low managers to entrench themselves rather than encourage them to act
in the best interests of the company. Some commentators have suggested
that managers should not be permitted to engage in any defensive tactics,
claiming instead that shareholders should be permitted to make their
own choices.2 72 This solution, however, goes too far. While prohibiting
defensive tactics eliminates target managers' conflict of interest, it also
270. Other constituencies include suppliers and the communities where a company's major
operations are located.
271. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (upholding
poison pill rights plan); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)
(upholding target management's use of exclusionary tender offer to purchase its own stock, not
including the shares owned by the hostile bidder); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 499, 199
A.2d 548, 554 (1964) (upholding "greenmail" transaction wherein target company funds were
used to repurchase shares held by hostile bidder).
272. See Gilson, supra note 226, at 52.' A variation on this proposal was adopted by the
19911
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prohibits managers from doing their job -making decisions in the corpo-
ration's best interest. Because of this conflict, the courts and many state
legislatures273 have continued to permit managers to act in the com-
pany's best interest while scrutinizing defensive tactics in an attempt to
prevent corporate managers from unduly favoring their self-interest.
Such a balanced approach permits managers to focus on their company's
long-term interests while providing some protection against managers'
acts of self interest. The following section examines this approach in
more detail.
D. State Corporate Law and the Short-Term Versus Long-Term
Debate
Although no longer fashionable in many circles, including some
state legislatures; the general rule remains that corporate managers owe a
fiduciary duty to their corporation and to the shareholders. The validity
of protecting shareholder ownership rights has been challenged by some
commentators who view the corporation as merely a contractual nexus of
various constituencies which control the firm through the contracting
process. These observers assert that it is not meaningful to talk in terms
of shareholder ownership.2 74 But this simply is not a satisfactory conclu-
Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 182 (Del. 1986). See infra notes 276-78 and accompanying text.
273. For a listing of representative state statutes, see infra note 301.
274. As explained by one commentator:
In this model, the firm is a "nexus of contracts" or a marketplace where various
constituencies contract for their own protection. The entrepreneurial concept of the
firm is rejected. Ownership of the firm disappears as a meaningful concept under this
model because no one can own a "nexus' Shareholders are merely parties to one
contract that comprises the firm. Moreover, control of the firm is shared among
various constituencies. Control is reflected in the terms of various contracts entered
into by individuals. According to this model, it makes little sense to focus upon
shareholders' "ownership" and control when various constituencies share control. It
also makes little sense to speak of "corporate" social responsibility because the firm is
only a "nexus." Various constituencies can obtain the protection they need by bar-
gaining for contract terms.
Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Means, 22 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 19, 23 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Produc-
tion, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777, 783 (1972);
Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375,
375 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs,
38 STAN. L. Rv. 271, 277-83 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 703-08 (1982); Frank. H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & EON. 395, 396-97 (1983); Eugene F. Fama,
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. EON. 288, 289, 292-95 (1980); Eu-
gene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON.
327, 331-32 (1983); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Con-
trol, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 302 (1983); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Move-
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sion in light of traditional norms of corporate governance. 275
The tension between maximizing shareholder wealth and protecting
non-shareholder constituencies shifted in favor of the former in a 1986
Delaware case. In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc.,2 76 the Delaware Supreme Court narrowed the availability of the
business judgment rule.2 77 This watershed ruling held that unless man-
agement has decided to try to keep the company independent, manage-
ment's sole obligation when faced with an offer is to maximize
shareholder profits. The Revlon court reasoned that once a company's
management has decided that the business is for sale, the directors' focus
must shift from the best interests of the corporation to the best short-
term investment interests of the shareholders.2 7 Presumably, the court
in Revlon decided that once target company management has decided
that it no longer can keep the company independent, it no longer has any
say in the future of the business. Therefore, target management's role is
reduced to that of mere auctioneer obtaining the highest possible price
for the shareholders who then can decide for themselves whether to ac-
cept the offer. The problem with such a result is that it clearly favors the
short-term interests of shareholders over the interests of others in the
ment, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1261-65 (1982); Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The
Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 264-76 (1986); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305, 305 (1976); Benjamin Klein, Contracting Costs and Residual Claims: The Separa-
tion of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 367, 370 (1983); William A. Klein, The Mod-
ern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1559-61 (1982);
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6
J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 262-73 (1977). For a discussion of the transaction cost approach, see
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 15-42 (1985); OLI-
VER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICA-
TIONS 248-63 (1975); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 245-54 (1979); Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern
Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. EON. LITERATURE 1537, 1543-51 (1981);
Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1198-1200 (1984).
275. Professor Eisenberg contends that "managing the corporation in the interest of the
shareholders is socially desirable, in that their interest coincides with the social interest in
efficiency." Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Legitimacy, Conduct, and Governance-Two
Models of the Corporation, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 5 (1983). Professor Bebchuck suggests
that corporate law treats the public corporation as if all of the shares were held by a single
owner. Lucian A. Bebchuck, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate
Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1700-06 (1985).
276. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
277. Id. at 182 (striking down "lock-up" option whereby target manager agreed to sell
corporate assets to a "white knight" in order to rebuff a hostile bidder); see, e.g., Ronald J.
Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 37, 45
(1990).
278. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
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corporate community. While forcing target management to take a
hands-off approach may be appropriate in some takeover battles, it may
not be proper when the long-term interests of other constituencies con-
flict with short-term maximization of shareholder wealth.
The following example demonstrates the problem with interpreting
the Revlon ruling as an absolute proposition. Assume that management
has been negotiating a friendly corporate combination under which it is
believed the company will merge into a larger enterprise, and the target
company's shareholders will receive the surviving company's shares,
thereby continuing to receive proceeds of the enterprise. Assume further
that, under the terms of the merger, the shareholders would enjoy the
benefits of the synergism resulting from the combination of the target
company's assets with those of the surviving enterprise.2 79 Finally, as-
sume that the planned merger would provide the target shareholders
with stock in the new company worth $50 per share. But, prior to the
signing of the merger agreement by the directors of the respective compa-
nies, a South American dictator decides to invest his illegal drug profits
in the target company and thereby offers $65 cash per share. This proves
to be the highest offer. Under a strict application of the Revlon rule,
target management can do nothing to interfere with the shareholders'
receiving the highest price for their shares, notwithstanding the fact that
they may well choose to sell to the dictator, an outcome clearly repug-
nant to the interests of all non-shareholder constituencies. Target man-
agers can act only if the company is not for sale.
In subsequent decisions the Delaware Supreme Court explained that
the auction duty is not absolute and only comes into play when the com-
pany is for sale. In a case involving the proposed merger of Warner
Communications and Time, Inc., the court wrote:
[A]bsent a limited set of circumstances as defined under Revlon,
a board of directors while always required to act in an informed
manner, is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder
value in the short term, even in the context of a takeover. In
our view, the pivotal question presented by this case is: "Did
Time, by entering into the proposed merger with Warner, put
itself up for sale?" 28 0
If the corporation is not for sale, then target company managers may
279. For a discussion of the synergistic effect of mergers, see Victor Brudney & Marvin A.
Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 308
(1974).
280. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990).
The court went on to observe in a footnote: "[W]e endorse the Chancellor's conclusion that it
is not a breach of faith for directors to determine that the present stock market price of shares
is not representative of true value or that there may indeed be several market values for any
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invoke the business judgment rule to implement defensive measures as
long as the directors are able to prove: (1) that a reasonable basis existed
for perceiving a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness; and (2) that
the defensive measures adopted were reasonable in relation to the threat
so posed.281
Legislation in many other states has given directors more leeway in
fending off takeover attempts28 2 and reflects the desire of these legisla-
tures to preserve jobs and economic growth within their respective states.
This type of legislation indicates the recognition that some corporate
constituencies have interests other than the shareholders' ownership in-
terest. The dichotomy between the Delaware case law and legislation in
other jurisdictions is based on the question of whether management's
only obligation is to maximize shareholder wealth.
Another recent transaction that raised questions of what constitutes
an appropriate management paradigm can be found in the background of
Time's acquisition of Warner Communications.283 Warner approached
Time with a merger proposal. Time management appeared receptive to
the proposal, but Paramount Communications intervened by offering
$200 per share for the Time stock-a price far in excess of the estimated
value of the proposed Warner/Time merger share exchange. As noted
earlier, Delaware law requires managers to seek the highest price for the
company if it is for sale.284 Accordingly, Time management appeared
bound to accept the Paramount offer or, alternatively, to seek a higher
offer. Time, however, responded by making a cash offer for Warner.
Since Time had decided to remain independent (albeit a completely dif-
ferent company after the Warner acquisition), it was free to embark on
the acquisition even though, as a result, the short-term goal of share-
corporation's stock." Id. at 1150 n.2 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 858, 876 (Del.
1985)).
281. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (upholding tar-
get management's use of exclusionary tender offer to purchase its own stock, excluding the
shares owned by the hostile bidder); see, eg., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, 599 A.2d
1261, 1285 n.35 (Del. 1989). The court in Time reaffirmed this test and explained that the
directors could satisfy the first prong of the Unocal test by "demonstrating good faith and
reasonable investigation." Time, 571 A.2d at 1152.
282. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d) (Bums Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Baldwin 1986); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 512 (Supp. 1991); see also William J. Carney, Shareholder Coordination
Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 AM.
BAR F.J. 341, 342 (1983) (arguing that "shark repellent" amendments to corporate charters
can eliminate the need for legislation).
283. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1149-55.
284. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1986);
see supra text accompanying notes 276-78.
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holder profit maximization was sacrificed. 85
How could management justify the Warner acquisition when it re-
sulted in a company valued approximately thirty percent below the two-
hundred dollar per share price offered by Paramount? One explanation
is that, in the long term, Time shareholders would fare better by holding
on to their Time/Warner stock than by selling their shares to Para-
mount. Implicit in this argument is that short-term profits should take
second chair to the long-term goals. If this argument were valid, why
then did the efficient market not fairly value the Time/Warner shares?
One commentator has suggested that this discrepancy represents the dif-
ference between the value of the stock as a relatively short-term invest-
ment, that is, as defined by market forces and investment objectives, and
the value of the stock in the market for corporate control.286
Professors Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means long ago established a
paradigm of corporate governance based upon shareholder supremacy.287
Clearly, from the perspective of the Time shareholders' short-term in-
vestment objectives, the Paramount offer was in their best interest. Does
this mean that under the Berle and Means paradigm, Time management
had an obligation to accept the Paramount offer or at least not to inter-
fere with it? Perhaps. The Berle and Means model, however, was pre-
mised on shareholder supremacy and does not take into account the
other corporate constituencies. 88 Considering the interests of these
other constituencies is not only consistent with, but necessary for the
long-term health of the corporation.289
The Paramount offer and business combination that would have fol-
285. Time, 571 A.2d at 1151. Once it became apparent that the Time/Warner deal was a
favorite to succeed, the Time stock dropped, trading a little above $140 per share. This
amounted to a price 30% below what shareholders would have realized under the Paramount
offer.
286. Lowenstein, supra note 236, at 268-309 (1983); see, e.g., Coffee, supra note 5, at 9. But
see Jensen & Ruback, supra note 236, at 20-21 (contending that changes in stock price during
takeovers overestimate the true efficiency gains from mergers).
287. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 293-98 (rev. ed. 1967).
288. A contrasting view was presented by Merrick Dodd, who believed that corporate
managers owe a duty beyond that owed to shareholders-namely, to be a responsible citizen in
society. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1145, 1162-63 (1932); see, e.g., Hazen, Persona, supra note 6, at 273; Thomas L. Hazen &
Bren L. Buckley, Models of Corporate Conduct: From the Government Dominated Corporation
to the Corporate Dominated Government, 58 NEB. L. REV. 100, 109 (1979); David Millon,
Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 203, 216-20 (1991).
289. One of the various anti-takeover responses taken by state legislatures has been to per-
mit, but not mandate, directors to take account of interests other than those of the sharehold-




lowed were not necessarily best for other Time constituencies, such as
employees and consumers. Is it necessarily true that short-term max-
imization of shareholder wealth is in the public interest?2 90 When a by-
product is the sacrifice of long-term concerns and the interests of other
constituencies, this writer submits that it is not.
The Delaware courts agreed with Time management's right to de-
termine the company's future. The Delaware Chancery Court empha-
sized the fact that the new post-acquisition entity would preserve Time's
corporate culture and that Time management was properly focusing
upon the company's long-term health. The Warner acquisition properly
was viewed as a publishing company's desire to expand its presence in
the entertainment industry.2 91 The Time-Warner combination was
therefore seen as consistent with Time's long-term plans. Conversely, the
acquisition of Time by Paramount would have meant an end to Time and
therefore would have sacrificed the long-term health of the company (as
perceived by incumbent Time management) for the short-term max-
imization of shareholder wealth.
The Chancellor in Time recognized the dangers of focusing on the
short term. The Delaware Supreme Court did not agree, however, and
characterized the Chancellor's "undue emphasis upon long-term versus
short-term corporate strategy" as "unwise." '292 The court explained:
Two key predicates underpin our analysis. First, Delaware law
imposes on a board of directors the duty to manage the business
and affairs of the corporation. This broad mandate includes a
conferred authority to set a corporate course of action, includ-
ing time frame, designed to enhance corporate profitability.
Thus, the question of "long-term" versus "short-term" values is
largely irrelevant because directors, generally, are obliged to
chart a course for a corporation which is in its best interests
without regard to a fixed investment horizon.293
290. See Eisenberg, supra note 275, at 5 (contending that the shareholders' interests gener-
ally coincide with efficiency). It has been suggested that equating shareholder wealth max-
imization with the proper outcome is based on a "crude sort of utilitarianism." Stone, supra
note 228, at 570.
291. Previously, Time had entered the entertainment industry, as evidenced by its earlier
acquisition of HBO cable television.
292. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).
But cf. Hahn v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., No. 9097 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 1987) (LEXIS, States library,
Del. file) (holding that the decision to pursue long-term goals is a business decision and is
subject to presumption of propriety under the business judgment rule).
293. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150 (citation omitted). Courts rarely have been willing to second-
guess the board of directors' balancing of long-term growth against shareholder wealth max-
imization. Compare Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 509-10, 170 N.W. 668, 685
(1919) (compelling dividend where corporation had surplus of capital) with Sinclair Oil Corp.
v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971) (holding that parent corporation's decision to pay
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The court nevertheless upheld the Chancellor's decision because other-
wise the court would be "substituting its judgment as to what is a 'better'
deal for that of a corporation's board of directors. ' 294 Other courts simi-
larly have indicated that management has the right to favor long-term
corporate interests over short-term shareholder wealth maximization.295
The directors nevertheless may go too far, in which case a court would be
willing to second-guess their judgment.296
Obviously, state legislatures and courts differ in the approaches used
to balance the interests of shareholders with the often conflicting inter-
ests of other stakeholders. To the extent that states limit manager auton-
omy in an effort to enhance shareholder rights, however, they may
inadvertently contribute to current overemphasis on near-term perform-
ance by corporate managements. The relationship between these two is-
sues is fairly straightforward: managers want to preserve their jobs;
takeovers threaten managers' jobs; state laws favoring shareholder rights
and limiting management autonomy raise the probability that a takeover
will succeed; therefore, managers of corporations subject to such laws
will react by focusing on the company's near-term performance in order
to keep the stock price high and thereby discourage any corporate raider
from eyeing his company as a possible target. Some managements may
decide that the best way to resist a corporate raider is by engineering
their own "takeover."
high dividends rather than expand business was not self dealing and thus was protected by
business judgment rule) and Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 142 A. 654, 660 (Del. Ch.
1928) (dismissing challenge to decision to increase dividends rather than expand operations).
294. Time, 571 A.2d at 1153.
295. See, e.g., TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,362, at 92,174 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (directors are not required to
"divert from [a] long term business plan in order to facilitate or propose an extraordinary
transaction designed to maximize current share value"); Hahn v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., No.
9097 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Del. file) ("While reasonable men may
disagree as to whether long-term growth objectives should prevail over short-term profit con-
siderations, the decision to pursue a long range objective is a business decision subject to a
presumption of propriety under the business judgement rule.").
296. See, eg., Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. UAL Corp., 717 F. Supp. 575, 586-87 (N.D. I11.
1989) (applying the Unocal test to strike down collective bargaining agreement designed to
prevent takeover). On rare occasions courts have interfered in other contexts. For example, in
the classic (if not aberrational) case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Corp., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W.
668 (1919), the court ordered the declaration of a dividend notwithstanding management's
claim that the accumulation of cash was necessary to facilitate planned expansion. The court
found no supportable basis for retaining idle cash notwithstanding its observation that "[i]t is
recognized that plans must often be made for a long future, for expected competition, for a
continuing as well as an immediately profitable venture." Id. at 508, 170 N.W. at 684.
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E. Management Buyouts and the Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy
Management buyouts provide a special case when analyzing the role
of the short-term/long-term dichotomy. When management decides to
enter the market for corporate control, its willingness to take the com-
pany private is unlikely to be motivated by the conviction that they
themselves have been running the company inefficiently. A more likely
explanation is that in proposing a management buyout, management is
saying that the market is undervaluing its efficiency. The fact that man-
agers are willing to take the company private indicates their conclusion
that the price of the stock is undervalued even when inflated by the pre-
mium that will have to be paid to take the company private.297
How do management buyouts relate to the traditional fiduciary
model, which says that management holds its power in trust for the cor-
poration's true owners-the shareholders? One can argue that in a man-
agement buyout, the managers are appropriating for themselves the
future profitability of the company that properly belongs to the share-
holders. Of course, this is not a proper justification. If true, it would
clearly constitute a breach of management's fiduciary duty. It seems
clear, however, that management buyouts are proper transactions so long
as management pays a fair price for the shares.298 Furthermore, to the
extent that the market is undervaluing the company's shares, a manage-
ment buyout is one device through which managers arguably can fulfill
their fiduciary obligations by maximizing shareholder wealth. The cor-
rectness of this position depends upon the legitimacy of trading long-
term prospects for short-term gain.
A common trait of the vast majority of management buyouts in re-
cent years has been the use of highly leveraged financing. As a result, the
company is transformed from a firm with equity-based ownership to one
of debt-based ownership. Aside from high debt levels and the conse-
quential increase in investment risk, these companies generally have a
totally different composition after restructuring. Management buyouts,
like most highly leveraged corporate transactions involving fundamental
organic change, frequently result in asset sales, plant closings, and em-
297. While managers might in good faith believe that they are acting out of their duty to
maximize shareholder profits, they themselves are economic persons. Accordingly, it is fair to
assume that their willingness to put their own funds at risk has at least a subsidiary profit
motive.
298. The problem, of course, arises in trying to determine what is a fair price. Cf. Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 878-80 (Del. 1985) (shareholder suit alleging that the board of
directors failed to reach an informed business judgment in accepting a merger proposal); Wein-
berger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-15 (Del. 1983) (shareholder suit alleging that the share
price accepted by the board of directors was unfair).
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ployee layoffs. Such moves are viewed as necessary to make the company
more efficient so that it can meet its higher debt payments. These
changes in turn create a different corporate culture than was present in
the former publicly held firm.'2 99 The vast increase in debt loads that
accompany the typical management buyout means that the new owners,
the former management, must place primary focus on meeting debt pay-
ments. A likely result of this burden is that the owners will gear their
planning efforts to maximizing short-term earnings at the expense of
longer-term considerations.
F Considering Other Constituencies
State legislatures have taken various responses to permit corporate
managers to fend off hostile takeover attempts.300 One type of statute
permits but does not require directors to take into account interests other
than the shareholders when making corporate decisions. These statutes
are referred to as "stakeholder" statutes because they recognize that con-
stituencies within the corporate community other than shareholders have
a stake in corporate affairs.30 1
299. These changes in the corporate structure, business, and culture may create an environ-
ment in which existing shareholders may not want to continue to participate. The fact that a
number of shareholders may want to have their interests redeemed, however, is not in itself a
justification for forcing out all public shareholders. The shareholders' desire to exit can be
accommodated by providing them with a choice of whether to participate in the highly lever-
aged restructured company.
Mandating that the shareholders be given such an opportunity would be consistent with
the equal treatment principle. See, eg., William D. Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to
Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. L. REv. 505, 505 (1965); Hazen, supra note
233, at 1060-67. The equal opportunity analogy is appropriate in the case of management
buyouts because managers generally own some stake in the company prior to the restructuring
and as controlling managers, they are giving themselves an opportunity that is not available to
the public, non-management shareholders. In other contexts, controlling shareholders' at-
tempts to appropriate such an opportunity for themselves have been held to be in breach of
their fiduciary duty to the other shareholders. See, eg., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal.
3d 93, 117-18, 460 P.2d 464, 478, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 606 (1969) (holders of 85% of the com-
pany's stock set up a holding company for their shares, followed by a public offering of the
holding company stock with the holders of the remaining 15% unable to participate in the
gains realized as a result of this public offering). By analogy, a management buyout can be
viewed as a reverse situation, wherein corporate managers appropriate for themselves the fruits
of a going-private transaction while forcing out the public shareholders (albeit at a price sub-
stantially in excess of the preexisting discounted market price).
300. See 1 HAzEN, supra note 68, § 11.21.
301. At least 23 states have enacted stakeholder statutes. See De Facto FederalAnti-Bidder
Stance Exists Through State Laws, IRRC Says, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1501
(Oct. 6, 1989). For representative statutes, see CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (West 1990); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 607.0830 (West Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West
Supp. 1990); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 172, § 13 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.251 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347 (Vernon 1991); NEB. REv. STAT.
SHORT-TERM/LONG-TERM DICHOTOMY
Several years ago, former SEC Chairman Shad, in his "Leveraging
of America" speech,3 "2 addressed the impact that leveraged buyouts
would have on this nation's economy. Among other things, he suggested
that as assets were sold off in order to satisfy debt payments many busi-
nesses would be forced to close, causing widespread job loss. While a
number of firms that have undergone leveraged buyouts or restructuring
have succumbed to such a fate, a majority have not, at least to date.
Corporate break-ups and dispersion of corporate assets may not al-
ways be a negative economic or social phenomenon but may simply re-
veal that the conglomerate craze of the 1970s was based on misplaced
assumptions about economies of scale in highly diversified companies.3
Jobs have been lost and communities damaged, however, in the wake of a
hostile takeover or leveraged buyout; many commentators have viewed
these consequences as negative outgrowths of those takeovers.3°
VI. CONCLUSION
Effective corporate management requires maintaining a proper bal-
ance between short-term and long-term goals. Absent a conflict of inter-
est, managers should have discretion to use their business judgment in
formulating corporate policy. The current investment climate, however,
focuses on short-term events. The proliferation of derivative investments
and the advent of computerized trading strategies have magnified this
focus. Market regulators have been concerned with the extent to which
new investments and new investment strategies affect stock market vola-
tility. Yet, they have not paid adequate attention to the extent to which
§ 21-2035 (Supp. 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10A-2 (West Supp. 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-35-202 (1988); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 180.305 (West Supp. 1990).
A committee of the American Bar Association Section on Business Law has concluded
that "other constituency statutes are not an appropriate way to regulate corporate relation-
ships or to respond to unwanted takeovers." Committee on Corporate Laws, ABA Section on
Business Law Other Constituencies Statutes: Potentialfor Confusion, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253, 2270
(1990). Among other things, the ABA Committee believed that these statutes create such a
fundamental change in the underpinnings of intracorporate relationships that they should not
be implemented without "extensive and broad-based deliberation." Id. at 2271.
302. See Leveraged Buyouts: How Real Are the Dangers, Bus. WK., July 2, 1984, at 72.
303. Deborah A. De Mott, Directors' Duties in Management Buyouts and Leveraged Recap-
italizations, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 536 (1988) (noting that it may not be "entirely coincidental
that the present era of extensive corporate restructurings and asset sales follow an era of exten-
sive conglomerate acquisition").
304. See, eg., Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 20-28 (1987). But cf Gregory R. Andre, Tender Offers for Corporate Con-
trol: A Critical Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 882-84 (1987)
(describing positive results of takeovers).
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the markets are creating additional pressure for both investors and cor-
porate managers to focus on the short term.
By necessity, corporate managers must be attuned to the pricing of
their company's securities. Price is significant, not only because of the
market for corporate control, but also because the marketability and
pricing of a company's stock affects its ability to raise additional capital.
Accordingly, corporate managers must be responsive to the short-term
dictates of the investment markets. Unfortunately, this combination of
forces has led to what many decry as an inappropriate focus for Ameri-
can business. The current trends in corporate law have been consistent
with corporate managers' focus on short-term wealth maximization as
opposed to the long-term health of their companies.
Most current proposals for regulatory reform of market activity
have been geared to curbing problems of excess volatility. Market regu-
lators have focused on day-to-day performance rather than upon the
long-term effects of current investment strategy and market regulation.
The time has come for regulators to consider not only the impact of the
proliferation of derivative investments upon market performance, but
also the extent to which market performance diverts the eyes of corpo-
rate managers from appropriate paths. Any astute observer would re-
spond that the role of the SEC is investor protection, not policing
corporate management. Furthermore, corporate management norms tra-
ditionally have been a question of state law, despite numerous proposals
over time that there be a federal law of corporations. Nevertheless, to
the extent that the markets skew share values, investor protection be-
comes a legitimate concern. The number of investors whipsawed in ex-
cessively volatile markets cannot be disregarded. Similarly, investors
who do not have the capital to engage in computerized trading and other
types of risk arbitrage cannot compete fairly in a market driven by such
trading strategies. Accordingly, excess volatility and its effects on share
prices are relevant regulatory concerns. To the extent that corporate
takeovers contribute to market volatility, it is a legitimate federal con-
cern to limit takeover and defensive tactics that interfere with market
integrity.
The current regulatory focus has been based on the assumption that
continued proliferation of derivative instruments increases market effi-
ciency and, therefore, market integrity. Mounting evidence indicates, to
the contrary, that derivative investments and new trading strategies con-
tribute to excessive volatility in the stock and other financial markets.
Unfortunately, the regulators seem to be more concerned with their turf
battle. The SEC and CFTC have been struggling over who will regulate
stock index and other financial futures. One unfortunate by-product of
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this turf battle is that the two agencies have not built up the sense of
common purpose and cooperation necessary to develop a meaningful reg-
ulatory policy.
Regulators currently concentrate on the prevention of fraud and
manipulation. Their oversight of the markets has been laissez-faire, the
underlying assumption of both the CFTC and the SEC being that more is
better with regard to the variety of derivative investment vehicles. This
proliferation of derivative investments may be as much a result of the
turf battle between the two agencies, their constituent exchanges, and the
legislative committees responsible for each agency as it is a reflection of
well-conceived regulatory policies grounded upon sound economic the-
ory. This Article has suggested that regulatory policy focus not so much
on who should regulate various financial investments, but rather on
whether the current laissez-faire regulatory philosophy is the appropriate
stance. The evidence suggests that it is not. Regulators, therefore,
should seriously consider limiting derivative investments and trading
strategies with a view towards restoring some stability in the financial
markets.
Market regulation has a significant impact on corporate managerial
decisionmaking. Federal regulatory policy generally does not concern
itself with corporate managerial norms because this area traditionally has
been reserved for state corporate law. Many corporate law developments
have had the unfortunate effect of further encouraging managers to focus
on the short term. Since the inception of corporate law, a continuous
struggle has been waged between management autonomy and share-
holder rights. At least in the context of corporate takeovers, the law
seems to be shifting too far in favor of shareholder-wealth maximization.
Management discretion should not go unchecked, especially in the con-
text of control battles where the desire for self-preservation may taint
managers' objectivity. Fiduciary principles were imported into corporate
law because of the wide variety of constituencies present. While some
constituencies may benefit from short-term wealth maximization, others
will not. Legislators, judges, and policy makers should think twice
before unduly negating the role of corporate managers' fiduciary
obligations.
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